

The Commander's Emergency Response Program: A Model for Future Implementation

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THE COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM: A MODEL FOR FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION, U.S. Army, 87 pages.

This monograph examines the execution of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) by operational forces and offers a methodology to better its execution. This study asserts that CERP is a necessary and appropriate program for operational U.S. forces. In order to improve the execution of the program, this monograph identifies four definitions of effectiveness: the political, strategic, operational and tactical, and the popular. In order to improve the efficacy of the program, training must integrate all definitions of effective CERP and be focused on the operational forces identifying and implementing projects. To accomplish this, the monograph introduces the following methodology: to create effective project outcomes, projects selected by operational forces must: *Identify* correctly the needs of the local populace, *Nest* within the national development strategy, *Validate* legitimate local power structures, *Employ* local labor and supplies, be *Sustainable* by local government after completion, be *Timely* in both initiation and completion, and analyze intended and unintended *Effects*. The *INVEST-E* methodology serves as a tool for commanders and their designated practitioners to properly select projects, increasing the effectiveness of CERP funds.

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Introduction

MAJ David Bailey's experience in Iraq with the 3rd Infantry Division led him to assess his experiences in the following way: "What is the best weapon to use on the counterinsurgency battlefield? One that does not create collateral damage, motivates the local populace to get involved, and causes the enemy to disband and surrender its cause. Money is that weapon."¹ The inability to separate the enemy from the populace and perform reconstruction and development tasks using traditional weapons and tactics made the introduction of Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) necessary. Specifically, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) has been an invaluable tool for operational forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This monograph addresses the successes and failures associated with operational forces' use of CERP. It seeks to answer two main questions:

1. Should operational forces utilize CERP?
2. Is their use of CERP effective?

An examination of the first question yields additional questions. First, why is CERP necessary? How did CERP evolve? Should operational forces conduct CERP, or is there another alternative? The answers to these questions will provide the logical foundation for determining if operational forces' use of CERP is effective. To adequately address this, supporting questions must also be answered: What is effective CERP? Are operational forces being trained to conduct effective CERP? If not, how should they be trained? A combination of scholarly literature, congressional testimony, doctrine, national and military directives, interviews, and lessons learned from both military stability operations and civilian post-conflict reconstruction efforts provide the evidence to support the study. Additionally, the recommendations offered by this monograph represent the

¹David Bailey, *3ID Nation Assistance: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, n.d.), 91.

operational experience of officers who participated in an anonymous survey at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Ultimately, this monograph seeks to determine how the effectiveness of CERP execution can be improved by the operational forces that are selecting and implementing projects. Enhancing the effectiveness of CERP depends on practitioners receiving the necessary training within the professional military education (PME) system. The thesis of this study is that to be effective, CERP must: *I*dentify correctly the needs of the local populace, *N*est within the national development strategy, *V*alidate legitimate local power structures, *E*mploy local labor and supplies, be *S*ustainable by local government after completion, be *T*imely in both initiation and completion, and analyze intended and unintended *E*ffects. The *INVEST-E* methodology serves as a tool for commanders and their designated practitioners to properly select projects, increasing the effectiveness of CERP funds. It emphasizes due diligence in the investment of CERP dollars to ensure desired short and long-term returns are realized.

The first chapter explains why CERP is a necessary tool for U.S. forces executing overseas contingency operations. It examines three distinct changes that have occurred in warfare: 1. The institutional recognition that the populace is the battlefield, not an obstacle upon it which must be avoided. 2. The evolution of a hybrid threat, which deliberately camouflages itself among the population while combining terror, guerrilla and conventional tactics. 3. Stability operations are now equal to major combat operations requiring U.S. military forces execute stability tasks when civilian professionals are not able. The combination of these changes necessitates the existence of CERP.

The next chapter explains CERP procedures and details its evolution into the program currently used by U.S. forces in overseas contingency operations. Though CERP is a living and evolving program, specific guidance exists that outlines the types of allowable projects, as well as restrictions on the use of those funds. There are specific requirements dictating how Project Payment Officers (PPOs) and Paying Agents (PAs) control CERP funds and a detailed format for

the submission of projects for command approval. These administrative requirements evolved as the program authority grew from a Memorandum, to a Fragmentary Order issued by the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), and finally into public law with CERP's introduction into Congressionally approved U.S. Appropriated Funds.

The third chapter focuses on whether operational forces should be conducting CERP. There are several alternatives for the execution of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) tasks: a civilian option, a military option, and a combined civ-mil option. Some argue that an international effort, managed by the United Nations, which integrates the knowledge and resources of the international community and non-governmental organizations, could yield the best results in SSTR. Others state that the U.S. military already possesses the capabilities and the mandate to conduct SSTR. Perhaps SSTR should be executed by what Thomas Barnett termed a "Sys-Admin Force," an organization that capitalizes on the capabilities from all services combined with the State Department and other government agencies to focus on stability operations.² This chapter analyzes these options comparing internal strengths and weaknesses with external opportunities and threats.

Chapter four addresses the question: Is CERP effective? This chapter identifies one of the main problems with CERP execution. The analysis reveals a disconnect between the perspectives of the politicians, the leaders at the strategic level, the operational forces who are selecting and implementing projects, and the population. The differences in desired effects represent a disunity of effort marginalizing the effectiveness of CERP.

Chapter five assesses if the commanders' designated CERP practitioners are being adequately trained to perform CERP. Examination of programs of instruction from the Army

²Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: Blueprint for Action* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2005), 30.

PME system, interviews, theater policies, and CERP survey results identify a second significant issue undermining the efficacy of CERP, the training audience and the training focus. Theater policies that govern CERP are designed to ensure oversight and meet Congressional mandates. As a result, CERP training focuses on resource managers, PPOs, and PAs who account for funds and manage projects from submission to completion. Ultimately, the training fails to develop CERP practitioners to go beyond ensuring CERP activities fall within the legal guidelines and that their projects are properly submitted.

The final chapter details the INVEST-E methodology as a solution to these problems. Applying the considerations within the INVEST-E methodology addresses the disunity between political, strategic, operational and tactical, and popular views of what CERP should achieve during project selection. Leaders at the tactical and operational levels are identifying and nominating CERP projects. They should be the focus of pre-deployment training to meet short-term requirements while course authors integrate INVEST-E into the Professional Military Education system to build a baseline competency on the employment of MAAWS within the officer corps.

Why is CERP necessary?

The short answer to this question is that fundamental characteristics of warfare have changed. To clarify, there have been three distinct changes in warfare that necessitate the use of CERP: how U.S. forces view civilians on the battlefield, the recognition that the tools of war were lacking against the hybrid threat, and the establishment of stability operations as an equal to major combat operations (MCO).

A paradigm shift has occurred in the way civilians on the battlefield are perceived. This shift is evident in doctrine and in the actions of those at the highest levels of command. The

“American Way of War” has historically combined technology, firepower and mobility into an aggressive hunt for the enemy’s main body.³ Civilians on the battlefield were viewed at best as an obstacle to be avoided and at worst a nuisance that would clog avenues of approach as they fled the conflict. The attention granted to civilians amounted to little more than an assessment of their impacts during mission analysis, a few coordinating instructions, rules of engagement and specified tasks in Annex Q (Civil-Military Operations) of the operations order. Though U.S. forces deliberately integrate civilians on the battlefield at every major training center and have historically conducted counter-insurgency operations (COIN) that integrated and depended on local civilians for success, it is only recently that US forces have recognized that the civilian populace *is* the battlefield.

This philosophical shift is most obviously seen in U.S. doctrine. In FM 100-5, Operations, dated 1993, there are 36 references to the planning considerations of: Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain and Weather, and Time (METT-T). There are only three references to civilians on the battlefield, each related to the need to follow the rules of engagement.⁴ The publication of the revised Operations field manual, FM 3-0, 2001, adjusted planning considerations to METT-TC. The “C” reflected the need to understand and adjust plans to account for civil considerations. FM 3-0 was revised and published again in 2008. This document signaled the paradigm shift. It recognized that military means alone would not yield success and gives equal weight to tasks dealing with the population with offensive and defensive operations. “Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them.”⁵

³Colin Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 11, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=650> (accessed January 28, 2010).

⁴*FM 100-5: Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 157.

⁵*FM 3-0: Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), vii.

U.S. military history offers many examples of COIN conducted by conventional U.S. forces. Even a cursory examination of these experiences reveals an understanding by commanders that battle would be fought in that small space between the ears of the people, the mind of the populace. Though the importance of the population was evident among leaders from the tactical to the strategic level, it never shifted the operational focus away from the insurgent. This has since changed. Evidence of this was present in 2003 upon entry into the division main operations center of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) established in one of Saddam Hussein's palaces on the outskirts of Mosul. Above the centerpiece map board was a sign that read, "We are in a race to win over the people. What have you and your element done today to contribute to victory?"⁶ This same philosophy is reflected in the most recent COIN and Stability Operations guidance issued by General McChrystal, Commander of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan: "We need to think and act very differently to be successful. The will of the people is the Objective. An effective 'offensive' operation is one that takes from the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose - control of the population. . . . Earn the support of the people and the war is won, regardless of how many militants are killed or captured."⁷

According to Colin Gray, "When success is possible. . . COIN wins in the minds, and preferably the hearts (though just minds may well suffice), of a public. . . . Victory will not be the product of engagements, even successful engagements. . . an irregular war can be lost militarily, generally it cannot be won in that mode."⁸ This paradigm shift has borne the term "human

⁶Dennis Steele, "The Race to Win the Peace," *Army Magazine* 53, no. 11 (11/01/2003): <http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSAT> (accessed December 10, 2009).

⁷Stanley McChrystal, *ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance* (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, 2009), 2.

⁸Colin Gray, 22-23.

terrain.” Colin Gray is referring to the human terrain or “the human population and society in the operational environment (area of operations) as defined and characterized by socio-cultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data and other non-geophysical information about that human population and society.”⁹ The acceptance that U.S. forces must operate in this “human terrain” has generated changes in how U.S. forces plan and conduct operations, focus their intelligence gathering and conduct strategic communications (StratCom). CERP’s focus on the population is a central feature of this paradigm shift. Its genesis and embrace by U.S. forces manifest the shift in mindset.

What has caused the most frustration is the realization that traditional weapons and tactics are no longer capable of delivering victory against the threat. Our enemies recognize the technological and lethality overmatch and have adjusted their modes and methods accordingly. They have emerged into what Hoffman terms a “hybrid” threat. He defines a hybrid threat as “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.”¹⁰ Recognizing the ambiguity within his definition, he explains that there are five elements of his definition: modality verses structure, simultaneous employment of multiple modes of fighting, fusion and coordination of different forces, that the threat demonstrates more than one mode within the conflict, and use of criminality as a source of conflict or revenue.¹¹

⁹Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow and Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,” *Military Review* (Sept-Oct 2006): http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/december_2006/12_06_2.html (accessed February 7, 2010).

¹⁰Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. compound war: The Janus choice: Defining today’s multifaceted conflict,” *Armed Forces Journal* (October 2009): <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4198658/> (accessed January 29, 2010).

¹¹Ibid.

Ultimately, arriving at the perfect definition is not as important as recognizing the flexibility, adaptability and the multi-faceted aspects of the threat.

The experiences of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed an enemy that seeks refuge by hiding among the populace and utilizes mass media to spread disinformation and promote fear in international and local audiences, while at the same time, blending a combination of terrorism and unconventional and conventional tactics in order to destabilize and delegitimize government efforts. The goal is to control the populace while seeking their political support. Thus, the challenge becomes separating the enemy from the populace. Kalyvas identifies this as the “problem of identification.”¹² There are two dimensions to the identification problem. The first is the refusal of the threat to be reduced to a single identity, that of combatant. The ability to employ a chameleon-type identity suitable for the situation will serve to protect him from detection. The second aspect is the refusal of the surrounding population to identify the threat. This may be a product of sympathy, fear, ignorance, or personal interest.¹³

The first dimension cannot be addressed given the inability to physically differentiate between enemy and civilian. The second dimension, however, can be addressed if the proper tools are employed. Morality, the laws of war, and the ever-present media watch-dog will ensure that U.S. forces’ ability to compel or coerce the population away from the threat will be woefully inadequate compared to the options available to the enemy. According to Kalyvas, “most ‘ordinary’ people appear to display a combination of weak preferences and opportunism, both of which are subject to survival considerations. Their association with risk-taking minorities [the threat] tends to be loose and subject to the fortunes of the war and its impact on one’s welfare.”¹⁴

¹²Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 89.

¹³Ibid. 89-91.

¹⁴Ibid. 103.

Weak preferences and opportunism among the population are targetable if U.S. forces are given the proper tools.

In the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, General Petraeus states: “Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict that support an insurgency.”¹⁵ CERP has evolved as the tool that allows U.S. forces to address this second dimension. Effective implementation of CERP projects designed to enhance the political, social and economic aspects of local conditions combined with an aggressive information campaign can affect preferences and opportunism. It simultaneously creates opportunity and fractures the enemy grasp on the populace.

James Stephenson, a retired senior Foreign Service officer, served in U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. His book, *Losing the Golden Hour*, details the failures of U.S. forces and government agencies under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) during post-conflict reconstruction. The term “golden hour” refers to the fleeting period of time after a critical injury during which implementation of lifesaving measures has a reasonable chance of success.¹⁶ Stephenson uses this metaphor to expound his critical account of U.S. efforts at stabilization and reconstruction after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Despite having expertise in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, the U.S. government agencies present in Iraq were unable to overcome bureaucratic in-fighting and security concerns. This meant they were unable to plan and execute a viable strategy to rebuild Iraq. Stephenson’s criticisms, along with an abundance of similar critiques that have emerged

¹⁵Petraeus, David. *The U.S. Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 2007), 54.

¹⁶Brook Lerner and Ronald Moscati, “The Golden Hour: Scientific Fact or Medical ‘Urban Legend’?” *Academic Emergency Medicine* 8, no. 7 (2001): 758-60.

since U.S. forces entered Iraq and Afghanistan, signaled a need for change in the operations of U.S. forces. There was no element of the U.S. Government prepared to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan.

In November 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. This directive would serve as the keystone for addressing the shortcomings identified in Iraq and Afghanistan by directing stability operations be given priority comparable to major combat operations. It expressly addressed and integrated across all Department of Defense activities which included: doctrine, training, resourcing, education, facilities and planning.¹⁷ This directive describes security, essential services and humanitarian needs as immediate goals of stability operations. Long-term goals include building host nation capacity to provide essential services, a market economy, democratic institutions, rule of law, and civil society.¹⁸ Though the document acknowledges that stability tasks are best performed by civilian professionals, the U.S. military must be prepared to perform the following tasks when civilians cannot: rebuilding indigenous institutions including security forces, correctional facilities, and courts necessary for security and stability; reviving or building private sector economic activity and supporting infrastructure; and developing representative governmental institutions. Arguably, without CERP, not a single task listed above is possible given the organization and equipment of U.S. forces.

The commander in the field recognizes that the population is the battlefield. Hiding amongst the people is a hybrid threat seeking to destabilize and delegitimize the government and

¹⁷U. S. Department of Defense, Directive Number 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington D. C.: U.S. Government, 2006), 2.

¹⁸Ibid.

control the population. He has been tasked to plan and conduct stability operations throughout every phase of major combat options. CERP is the most readily available tool to operational forces that allow them to address each of these realities that define the operational environment.

How did CERP evolve?

CERP is designed to allow commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction within their Areas of Responsibility (AORs) in order to respond to the needs of the local populace. “Reconstruction” is not strictly defined as restoring a structure or function to pre-conflict conditions, while the term “Urgent” is defined as “any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the judgment of a local commander, calls for immediate action.”¹⁹ Since its creation in the summer of 2003, CERP has been a continually evolving program. The intent and flexibility of the program has generated projects ranging from a little over \$100 for a water pipe repair to over \$11 million for an electrical distribution system.²⁰

Within days of ousting Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist Party from power in Iraq, soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division began to find large sums of money as they searched for former regime leaders. In the cottage of one Ba’athist official soldiers found \$650 million in sealed stacks of \$100 bills stored in aluminum boxes. Days later, an additional \$112 million was

¹⁹Douglas Brook, Memorandum For Secretaries of the Military Departments, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Commander United States Central Command, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: SUBJECT: Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Guidance (Washington D. C.: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), December, 18 2008), 1.

²⁰U. S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-736R Military Operations: Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for Commander’s Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq (Washington D. C.: U.S. Government, 2008), 3.

found in a nearby animal kennel.²¹ The United States Treasury Department advised the Department of Defense on the handling of these seized funds to ensure accountability, documentation and transparency. In coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Defense Department determined that according to federal law, these funds were not considered “miscellaneous receipts” for use by the U.S. Government.²² Forensic accountants determined that the funds were illegally skimmed from such programs as the Oil for Food Program. After ensuring that the seizure, control and distribution of former Ba’athist Officials’ property complied with international law, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that U.S. forces would safeguard the funds as property of the Iraqi people.²³

After coalition forces toppled Saddam’s regime, the combination of damage resulting from high intensity conflict and the cessation of all civil services such as refuse collection, utility services and food distribution created a humanitarian crisis that worsened each day. Early humanitarian tasks fell on the shoulders of U.S. forces occupying Iraqi cities. Deteriorating conditions for the Iraqi people generated an endless list of relief needs that quickly exceeded the capabilities of the operational forces on the ground. Though advised by Judge Advocates that operational funds could be used to conduct humanitarian relief, clarity over whether appropriated funds could be used to pay wages to Iraqi workers prompted the leadership to utilize the seized Iraqi funds to finance clean-up and repair in the wake of initial combat operations. The V Corps Commander issued Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 104M to Operation Order Final Victory titled “Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Recovery Program To Directly Benefit the Iraqi People”

²¹David Zucchini, *Troops Find Baghdad Stash: \$650 Million—Little-noticed Cottages Hold Boxes of Cash*, San. F. Chron, Apr. 19, 2003, at A-10; Interview with Colonel David Perkins, Former Commander of 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 2003)

²²Mark Martins, “No Small Change of Soldiering: The Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq and Afghanistan,” *The Army Lawyer* (February 2004): 3.

²³*Ibid.*

on May 7, 2003.²⁴ This FRAGO directed the use of seized funds to address the humanitarian requirements as well as the oversight and separation of funds from U.S. appropriated funds.

To ensure the legitimacy of the program, on June 16, 2003, Ambassador Bremer²⁵, the Coalition Provisional Authority, signed a memo re-delegating authority over the use of Iraqi State-owned property to the Commander of Coalition Forces. The memo authorized the Commander “to take all actions necessary to operate a Commanders’ Emergency Response Program.”²⁶ This memo provided the necessary link between authority and law to allow the expenditure of the seized funds.

Days later, on June 19, 2003, the CJTF-7 Commander issued FRAGO 89 implementing CERP. FRAGO 89 provided subordinate commanders with guidance on approval authorities, permissible projects, limitations on the use of funds and specific accounting and administrative requirements.²⁷ Approval authority for the expenditure of CERP funds went no lower than Brigade Commanders. According to FRAGO 89, permissible reconstruction projects were defined as:

the building, repair, reconstitution, and reestablishment of the social and material infrastructure in Iraq. This includes but is not limited to: water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, healthcare, education, telecommunications, projects in furtherance of economic, financial, management improvements, transportation, and initiatives which further restore of [sic] the rule of law and effective governance, irrigation systems installation or restoration, day laborers to perform civic cleaning, purchase or repair of civic support vehicles, and repairs to civic or cultural facilities.²⁸

²⁴Headquarters, U.S. Army V Corps, Fragmentary Order 104M to Operation Order Final Victory (070220L May 03).

²⁵Ambassador Bremmer had been delegated authority by the Deputy Secretary of Defense over “Certain State or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq”

²⁶Martins, 6.

²⁷Headquarters, Combined-Joint Task Force 7, Fragmentary Order 89 (Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) Formerly the Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Fund) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036 (192346 June 03)

²⁸Ibid.

Funds could be used to purchase items from local suppliers and could employ Iraqis. CERP could not be used if the funds: directly or indirectly benefited CJTF-7 or Coalition Forces, paid salaries of Iraqi civil functionaries, financed rewards or weapons buy-back, purchased weapons or explosives, entertained the local populace, provided direct support to individuals or private businesses, or duplicated a service available by local government.²⁹ Commanders were to assign project purchasing officers (PPOs) who had already been trained in contract procedures. These PPOs would use the same standard form (SF) 44 for CERP projects as used for the expenditure of normal appropriated funds. The SF 44 could be used for projects amounting up to \$100,000, though notification of the division commander was necessary for projects exceeding \$10,000.³⁰

In order to minimize duplication of efforts, FRAGO 89 directed coordination with regional CPA offices, governance support teams, and civil affairs elements. Commanders submitted weekly CERP usage reports detailing the type of project, cost, location, and date completed. Initially, division commanders were allocated \$500,000 and each brigade commander received \$200,000. The seized funds were a finite asset, so the guidance emphasized getting a reasonable price on labor and materials from local markets.³¹

Within six weeks, CJTF-7 issued two FRAGOs making minor adjustments to CERP. FRAGO 250 allowed CERP funds to pay rewards for information on weapons caches and former regime officials, and FRAGO 480 made battalion and squadron commanders the lowest approval

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Martins, 7.

³¹Ibid.

authority for CERP projects.³² Within the first few months, CERP funding had a significant impact on the Iraqi populace by addressing many needs resulting from the conflict. By mid-October 2003, CERP had funded over 11,000 completed projects ranging from sanitation, infrastructure repair, restoring government facilities and distributing aid to conflict-displaced civilians. These projects injected \$78.6 million into local economies throughout Iraq by purchasing materials and providing jobs.³³

Though originally intended to fund small scale, immediate-impact projects, commanders began to increase the scope and size of projects to include projects in the security sector, infrastructure and industrial capacity. During September and October 2003, average CERP project cost increased from \$4,000 to \$17,000.³⁴ This presented a potential conflict since President Bush signed HR 1559 on April 16, 2003, lifting economic sanctions against Iraq and directing a nearly \$2.5 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for large-scale projects.³⁵ However, delays in initiation and funding projects under the purview of the IRRF caused commanders, who viewed many of these projects as “essential” needs of the Iraqi people, to use CERP in order to address the problems within their AORs.

Despite the potential overlap of military-directed projects with those of the IRRF mandate, the success of CERP from the perspective of the commanders on the ground and the local people was undeniable. The senior military leadership conveyed the importance of the

³²Headquarters, Combined-Joint Task Force 7, Fragmentary Order 250 (Amendment to the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) Formerly the Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Fund) to CJTF-7 OPOD 03-036 (011947 July 03). and Headquarters, Combined-Joint Task Force 7, Fragmentary Order 480 (C1 to FRAGO 250M—Amendment to Commander’s Emergency Response Program) to CJTF-7 OPOD 03-036 (222351 July 03).

³³Martins, 8.

³⁴Ibid. 9.

³⁵Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, “Congress Gives President Bush Authority to Suspend Sanctions Against Iraq – Creates Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” *Client Alert*, April 13, 2003, 1 http://iraqreconstruction.pillsburylaw.com/documents/Newsbrief_Congress_Gives_Bush_Authority_to_Suspend_Sanctions.pdf (accessed December 10, 2009).

program to Ambassador Bremer. During Ambassador Bremer's visit to the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, General David Petraeus recalls telling the Ambassador that in this environment "money is ammunition . . . and that we didn't have much."³⁶ Ambassador Bremer returned to Baghdad, increased the amount of seized Iraqi funds allocated to CERP and began searching for other sources to fund the program.

With recommendations from the commanders on the ground in Iraq and officials within the CPA, the Administration included \$180 million in CERP funding as part of the Operations and Maintenance (O & M) funds in the emergency supplemental funding bill.³⁷ Congressional staffers took notice of the addition of CERP to the bill as it had not been part of the original request from the Administration. Despite rave reviews of CERP successes in media outlets such as the *Washington Post*, many Senators and Congressmen were hesitant about funding CERP using O & M appropriations. This unease stemmed not only from a lack of familiarity with the program, but concern over use of O & M funds to finance projects whose funding had already been allocated in the reconstruction legislation for Iraq and Afghanistan and the specific language associated with CERP in the bill. Thus, in order to ensure the flexibility and responsiveness of the program, CERP would be included in O & M funds and available for use "notwithstanding any other provision of law."³⁸ This meant that military commanders would be able to fund projects at their discretion without being required to follow procedures outlined in Armed Services Procurement Act, Competition in Contracting Act, Foreign Claims Act, and many other

³⁶Dennis Steele, "The Race to Win the Peace," *Army Magazine* 53, no. 11 (11/01/2003): <http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSAT> (accessed December 10, 2009).

³⁷Martins, 10.

³⁸Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, § 1110, 117 Stat. 1209, 1215.

Federal Acquisition Regulations.³⁹ While congressional staffers recognized the success of the program depended on avoiding the very restrictions that were delaying the use of appropriations from the IRRF and Afghanistan reconstruction funds, the prospect of losing control of the military's purse strings entailed a considerable transfer of authority away from the legislature.

In a briefing from the Joint Staff to the Senate Appropriations Committee on October 22, 2003, military officials described CERP as:

a stabilization phase tool no less essential to victory than the world's finest tanks, weapons, ships, planes, communications, and individual protective gear with which Congress had already equipped the military. When spent well, CERP funding convinced Iraqis that the coalition was truly committed to their well-being, increased the flow of intelligence to commanders and soldiers about hostile actors in the community, and improved security and economic conditions.⁴⁰

Discussions of accountability of funds and program policies convinced congressional members to forward the Emergency Supplemental Funding bill to the President for signature. The only caveat was that the Secretary of Defense would provide quarterly reports detailing the source, allocation and use of the funds. On November 6, 2003, the President signed the bill into law committing \$180 million of appropriated funds for CERP and creating a similar program in Afghanistan.⁴¹ Since 2004, Congress has authorized \$3.65 billion for CERP in Iraq and \$1.6 billion for CERP in Afghanistan.⁴²

³⁹Martins, 11.

⁴⁰Joint Staff, Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), Briefing for Senate Appropriations Committee (Oct. 22, 2003)

⁴¹Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.

⁴²*Quarterly Report to the United States Congress: Section 2: Iraq Reconstruction Funding and Uses* (Washington D. C.: Special Inspector General of Iraq, October 30 2009), 30, <http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct09/Default.aspx> (accessed December 10, 2009).

See also *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* (Washington D. C.: Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 30 2009), 18, <http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct09/pdf/SIGAROct2009Web.pdf> (accessed December 10, 2009).

Since its inception in 2003, CERP has continued to evolve in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though there are slight differences in CERP in each theater, the program has four primary components: reconstruction, humanitarian relief, battle damage, and condolence payments. The intent of CERP is to fund projects that can be sustained by the local government or populace which do not exceed \$500,000. Projects exceeding \$500,000 are not prohibited, however. Should a project exceed \$500,000 it requires MNC-I Commander or USFOR-A Commander approval. Projects exceeding \$1,000,000 require Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approval. The individual CERP project cap is set at \$2 million, but may be waived by the SECDEF.⁴³ Reconstruction and humanitarian relief projects may be performed in the following areas: water and sanitation projects, food production and distribution, agriculture and irrigation projects, electricity, healthcare, education, telecommunications, economic, financial, and management improvements, transportation, rule of law and governance, civic cleanup activities and civic support vehicles, repair of civic and cultural facilities, protective measures for critical infrastructure sites, or other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects.⁴⁴ Condolence and Battle Damage payments may not exceed \$2,500 per incident.⁴⁵ Similar to condolence payments, Hero payments are made to the spouse or next of kin of a host nation soldier, policeman, or in some cases a civilian who is killed while conducting operations in support of U.S. or coalition forces.

⁴³Headquarters, Multinational Corps-Iraq, *Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS): MNC-I CJ8 SOP* (Baghdad, Iraq: MNC-I CJ8, January 2009), B-2.

⁴⁴Christopher White, *Money as a Weapon System - Afghanistan: USFOR-A PUB 1-06* (Kabul, Afghanistan: USFOR-A J8, June 2009), B-14-1. (For expanded guidance on allowable projects see Appendix A)

⁴⁵These payments are not an admission of guilt or a Solatia payment as described under the Foreign Claims Act, but rather a means for the commander to express sympathy and respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the local populace after the death of a family member, battle related injury or damage to property. Pittman, B-11

CERP funds may not be used for: direct or indirect benefit to U.S., Coalition, or other supporting personnel; providing goods, services, or funds to national armies, police or security forces; weapons buy-back programs; entertainment; reward programs; removal of unexploded ordnance; duplication of services available through municipal governments; salaries, bonuses, or pensions of military or civilian government personnel; support to individuals or private businesses; conducting psychological operations, information operations, or other U.S., Coalition, or Host Nation Security Force operations; loans or capitalization of lending institutes; purchasing goods or services from any U.S. trade-sanctioned nation; or stipends for trainees of CERP-funded education or training programs.⁴⁶

What are the approaches to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)?

The Congressional Research Service, in its 2008 report to Congress on DOD's role in foreign assistance, addressed this very question. After examining DOD's conduct of SSTR, the report highlighted several criticisms: the absence of long-term strategic planning, a shortage of expertise in the application of "best practices" in economic and political development, the militarization of aid operations making aid organizations a viable target for hybrid threats, and the perception that military forces are more competent than civilians in executing government responsibilities.⁴⁷ These were not surprising findings, since DOD Directive 3000.5, which makes state-building a core military mission, recognizes that "many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when

⁴⁶Pittman, B-3.

⁴⁷Nina Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress* (Washington D. C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 16-20, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34639_20081209.pdf (accessed February 17, 2010).

civilians cannot do so.”⁴⁸ Thus, given these issues, perhaps another approach would better conduct SSSTR.

There are two alternatives to using U.S. operational forces for SSSTR, the civilian option (international government organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other U.S. government agencies (USG)), and a combination civilian-military force similar to what Thomas Barnett terms a “Systems Administrator” (SysAdmin) in his book *The Pentagon’s New Map*.⁴⁹ While many critics advocate the execution of SSSTR tasks by non-military or the creation of a civilian-military force specifically designed for SSSTR, they overlook many of the internal and external aspects of these options which make the current use of U.S. operational forces necessary. Analyzing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) it is possible to draw a distinction between these three options with an understanding of the internal strengths and weaknesses and the external opportunities and threats.

The Civilian Option

The civilian option refers to the exclusive use of organizations outside the uniformed services. To assess this option, this study defined the category of organizations that would conduct relief and development activities in conflict prone areas of the world. The primary IGOs are the World Bank and the United Nations, under which the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) operate individually, under UN mandate, or consolidated under a proscribed assistance mission such as the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA). There are a multitude of NGOs who vary in purpose, philosophy, area of expertise, and capability. There are NGOs that operate

⁴⁸U. S. Department of Defense, Directive Number 3000.05, 2.

⁴⁹Barnett, 30.

in a specific community, in a specific nation, or internationally. NGOs can be further divided into two categories, operational NGOs whose focus is the design and implementation of development-related projects, and advocacy NGOs who promote a specific cause or seek to influence specific policies.⁵⁰ This study focuses on the attributes of development-focused NGOs. Lastly, the civilian option consists of government agencies such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) whose activities seek to provide development in accordance with U.S. foreign policy goals. While these organizations are very diverse with respect to organization, personnel, and mandate, which often cause conflict, the attributes assessed here consistently apply to those within the development field.

Civilian Option		
Internal	Strengths	Weaknesses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Neutrality/Impartiality •Development expertise •Population focus •Long-term outlook 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Operating in a non-permissive environment •Operational reach •Limited planning culture •Cost
External	Opportunities	Threats
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Perceived motives •Relationship with local government •Legitimacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Inflation/Dependency •Security from attacks

The most pronounced strength of the civilian option is the motivation behind the conduct of humanitarian actions and how that impacts the delivery of aid. Civilian organizations conduct operations in a manner that meets immediate needs while also maximizing longer-term prospects. There is no desire to win “hearts and minds” on the basis of whether the beneficiaries will be of

⁵⁰“NGO World Bank Collaboration,” FIELD Online, http://www.gmfield.info/Assets/8/20040506104105_10-3-36-111.pdf (accessed February 27, 2010).

political assistance in the future.⁵¹ United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, welcoming the renewal of the UNAMA mandate by the Security Council in March 2009, stated that it served as the reaffirmation of the “central and impartial role” in the promotion of peace and stability.⁵²

Another strength of the civilian option is the knowledge and skills in SSTR tasks. The ability to focus on development yields specific and technical expertise which translates readily into best practices. In addition to possessing a lot of experience which serves to create this expertise, the humanitarian focus of development organizations engenders a sense of cooperation and the sharing of knowledge. An example is the Global Development Commons (GDC) initiative by USAID. The GDC promotes innovation for international development through knowledge sharing, partnerships, and collaborative problem-solving. GDC members recognize that identifying and fostering innovations through open approaches can improve the ability to deliver on the core mission.⁵³

Civilian organizations also have the ability to approach solutions with a long term outlook. For example, UNAMA’s 2005 strategy document for assisting Afghanistan achieve the UN’s Millennium Development Goals is titled “Vision 2020.” This document details a fifteen-year time horizon for the accomplishment of an “Afghanized” version of the Millennium Development Goals.⁵⁴

⁵¹The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, ed. Joseph Cerami and Jay Boggs (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 83, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=828> (accessed January 29, 2010).

⁵²“Mandate.” United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan. <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1742> (accessed February 27, 2010).

⁵³“Global Development Commons,” USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/gdc/about.html (accessed March 2, 2010).

⁵⁴*Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals Report 2005 Vision 2020* (United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan, 2005), 6, <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/MDG-2005-vision2020.pdf> (accessed February 27, 2010).

The most limiting weakness for the civilian option is the inability to operate in a non-permissive environment. In assessing post-conflict environments, Schiavo-Campo states that “land movement is impossible through some areas, through others only during daylight, and not risk-free anywhere. . . technical and financial assistance cannot possibly be effective if program implementation and general economic activity are constrained by lack of physical security.”⁵⁵

The lack of security exacerbates another weakness which is the limited operational reach of civilian organizations. The lack of manpower and logistical capability to operate in austere environments remains a significant hurdle to development projects. UNAMA has a total of 1500 personnel, 80% of which are Afghan nationals.⁵⁶ Similarly, the United States Department of State has only 6,500 Foreign Service officers and USAID only about 1,000, both of which are spread around the globe.⁵⁷ These organizations are some of the largest with a development mandate, yet manpower severely limits their ability to implement their strategies. Despite employing people with extensive development experience there is a distinct absence of a planning culture. Well-conceived strategic goals are marginalized by the inability to link them to task execution. Diana Chigas expands on this weakness stating, “NGOs have limited their own effectiveness: in project planning and implementation that does not foresee negative conflict impacts and do not consider how the individual programs fit into the larger peace building picture.”⁵⁸ Other evidence of planning failures are illustrated by Lew Irwin, “these agencies then complete projects that are only partially resourced, such as constructing schools without

⁵⁵S Schiavo-Campo, *Financing and Aid Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations*: World Bank Working Paper No. 6, CPR Working Papers. (Social Development Department, 2003), 30.

⁵⁶“Mandate.” United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan.

⁵⁷The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 14.

⁵⁸Diana Chigas, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 572.

providing the teachers needed to staff them; building courthouses or jails where no trained judges or prosecutors exist; or undertaking other similarly shortsighted projects that have impact only if one's metric for success is counting how many projects have been completed.”⁵⁹

The cost to operate in post-conflict environments is another weakness of civilian organizations. It is difficult to determine costs of things such as personnel, insurance, security due to the pervasive lack of stability in the region. An unpublished snapshot of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) intranet shows that in 2009, the worldwide average program budget applied just over 45% of the available funds to program operations. The remaining 55% of donor funding paid for personnel expenses and miscellaneous and “other” expenses.⁶⁰ While these figures represent only an average program budget for the UNDP, it illustrates that for every dollar of donor funding, a large percentage of that amount must pay for administrative services, personnel, and facilities before program execution begins.

The external opportunities and threats derive from many of these strengths and weaknesses. The perception of impartiality and altruism will serve to build trust between the civilian organizations and the people whom they are trying to assist. They will be able to foster long term relationships from the local to the national level as they implement their long-term strategies. Ultimately, they will create a perception of legitimacy for their organization as well as the government they are assisting to develop.

The most pronounced threat is the ease at which civilians can be targeted by anti-government and criminal elements. The linkage between successful development and successful governance will create a security threat, despite every attempt to remain impartial. Any anti-government group that seeks to delegitimize the government can target civilians conducting

⁵⁹Lew Irwin, “Filling Irregular Warfare’s Interagency Gaps,” *Parameters* (Autumn 2009): 65-80.

⁶⁰United Nations Development Program, UNDP Financial Details by Account, Online screenshot of Executive Snapshot v 4.7 created February 6, 2010. (on file with the author).

development activities. This was illustrated by a member of USAID working in Afghanistan on a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT), “The enemy is very actively seeking to kill you and undermine you. Building a hospital or a school is not a neutral or apolitical act. That is extending the reach of the government, which is exactly counter to what the Taliban want.”⁶¹

The following threats are interrelated: a drain of intellectual capital, inflation, and dependency. The absence of a large expeditionary civilian contingency dictates that similar to UNAMA, much of the workforce will be hired locally. Local hires would need to speak a language other than the local dialect. Inevitably, this requirement would take an educated person away from a local job; potentially a critical job within the government or medical field. Similarly, hiring many workers would infuse money into the local economy that would not otherwise exist, creating inflation. If a civilian organization remained in one area long enough, they would create a dependency based not only upon the aid they are providing, but also the income they are injecting into the system via salaries and daily operating costs.

The Military Option

“Where can we find large numbers of disciplined and well-trained professionals with the logistical wherewithal to move critical supplies and rebuild essential facilities and services, able to operate in environments lacking indigenous infrastructure, and to defend themselves against those who stand to benefit from chaos?” And invariably, the answer came back “Call the Pentagon!”⁶² Historically, military humanitarian aid operations have utilized manpower, transportation and logistical strengths. Recent examples outside of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were the use of Chinook helicopters to deliver aid and relief personnel in the

⁶¹*Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan 2003-2005*, ed. Christopher Koontz (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2008), 543.

⁶²James Ellsworth, *SysAdmin: Toward Barnett’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Force* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, 2006), 4.

mountains of Pakistan after the earthquake in October 2008 and the deployment of a Carrier Task Force to deliver relief supplies, evacuate and treat wounded, and provide basic needs such as shelter and potable water immediately after the Tsunami struck the coast of Indonesia and Sumatra in December 2004. The narrow scope of military aid operations changed with the introduction of CERP. With CERP, commanders have the ability to select and execute projects which allay the immediate humanitarian needs of the people in the area of responsibility. No longer are units limited to the execution of tasks within the capabilities offered by their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). Like the civilian option, the military option has many internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats.

Military Option		
Internal	Strengths	Weaknesses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Self-securing •Organic capabilities •Experience in bureaucracy •Planning culture •Unity of command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Lack of development expertise •Short-term outlook •Broad mission focus
External	Opportunities	Threats
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Operational reach •Situational understanding •Link between projects and strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Popular distrust •Militarization of aid efforts

The most obvious strength is the ability to self-secure in a non-permissive environment. Many relief organizations are not willing to enter an area due to security concerns or because they do not understand the local dynamics well enough to operate successfully in the region.⁶³ A rifle platoon conducting a humanitarian mission is just as formidable as a platoon conducting a raid or security patrol. Couple this with a robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

⁶³Leonard DeFrancisci, "Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN", *Military Review* (May-June 2008): 27.

capability, and you have an organization conducting humanitarian operations that must only defend against a well-organized and equipped attacker.

Another strength is the capabilities delivered by such a large organization. Providing safety and security for humanitarian operations is but one capability. According to a 2007 report to Congress on the implementation of DOD directive 3000.5, technical and administrative specialists such as military Civil Affairs, engineers, police, and Judge Advocate officers provide interim capability to help stabilize essential service sectors.⁶⁴

Outside of capabilities specific to the military specialties, the military is a large bureaucracy. To be successful in this bureaucracy, leaders must possess the temperament and skills to organize, motivate, and direct the actions of others in and out of government towards accomplishing public purposes.⁶⁵ These skills in public management assist the military as it engages in SSTR tasks that would otherwise be outside the organization's expertise. Within the military there is a culture of planning and execution. Plans are developed by commanders who will supervise their execution, readiness is continuously evaluated, resources are defined and justified, and clarity of roles, missions, authority, and responsibility exists.⁶⁶ Unity of command within the military yields clarity of lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability that is indispensable for success in combat operations. The military has embraced a tradition of "someone in charge" during combat operations that readily translates to SSTR operations.⁶⁷

⁶⁴Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington D. C.: Secretary of Defense, 2007), 21.

⁶⁵Cerami & Boggs, 472.

⁶⁶Defense Science Board, *Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington D. C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2004), 35.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 8.

Despite operational and administrative capabilities consistent with those needed for SSTR tasks, the greatest weakness for the military option is the lack of expertise in the development field. Interviews with military officials in a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on military and interagency cooperation in CERP project execution stated that the greatest weakness was the lack of subject matter experts in areas such as agriculture, construction, and public health.⁶⁸

Additionally, the rotation of units and their desire to have “immediate impact” as proscribed within CERP guidelines creates short-sightedness in the execution of SSTR tasks. At the strategic level there is recognition that most of the development needs require a long term strategy. However, the combination of a dynamic security environment requiring the flexible employment of operational forces and year-long unit deployments begets little more than a short-term SSTR outlook.

The addition of stability operations as a core mission to traditional offensive and defensive operations is another identified weakness of using the military in SSTR. The military is expected to successfully combine offensive, defensive and stability operations in a synchronized and simultaneous fashion.⁶⁹ The concept of full spectrum operations creates a broad focus for operational forces. This broad focus creates two problems: a potential conflict between mission requirements and the allocation of limited training time and resources. Operational forces are required to execute missions spanning the spectrum from major combat operations (MCO) to counter-terrorism (CT) to counter-insurgency (COIN) to the delivery of humanitarian aid (HA). A conflict emerges when “kill and capture” missions affect the very population in which stability

⁶⁸Sharon Pickup, *MILITARY OPERATIONS: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan* (Washington D. C.: Government Accountability Office, 2009), 9, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09615.pdf> (accessed March 2, 2010).

⁶⁹*Operations: FM 3.0* (Washington D. C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 3-1.

operations are aimed. In addition, such a wide range of requirements will inevitably cause commanders to assume some risk when allocating limited time and resources to training. Commanders are more likely to focus training on tasks where failure results in the loss of life versus a set-back in the development strategy.

These strengths and weaknesses create distinct opportunities and threats. The most pronounced opportunity capitalizes on the capabilities offered by the military option. In order to perform their mission, they are manned, equipped, and resourced in such a manner that no location is out of reach. The combination of transportation, logistics, and manpower ensures an operational reach far exceeding that of any civilian organization focused on stability and reconstruction. The size of the force and the operational reach provide the military with a better understanding of the conditions the population are facing. Throughout the full spectrum of operations, interaction with the populace is imperative to mission success. The resulting situational understanding allows for the opportunity to conduct SSTR efforts in more areas with a better understanding of the needs of the people. The latter opportunity is a product of the military's planning culture and unity of command. In combination, these strengths serve as the connection between the reconstruction and development strategy and individual project execution.

The greatest threat to the military option's stability and reconstruction efforts is the populace's distrust of the true motives of military forces conducting SSTR. From the population's perspective, the requirement to seek out and eliminate the enemy appears to be the dominant motivation. In most cases, this perception is correct. Major (MAJ) Nathan Springer, recounting his experiences in the Afghan village of Saw stated,

Saw was a U.S. friendly village until one night a U.S. Army unit acted on bad intelligence and raided the village. The unit was searching for a high value target (HVT) that had been responsible for rocket attacks against the American Forward Operating

Base to the north. The unit did not find the HVT, searched each house, kicking in a number of doors, and left as quickly as they came. The village elders felt dishonored and decided to withdraw from contact with U.S. forces after that day.⁷⁰

After that incident, the village elders were unreceptive to SSTR efforts, viewing them as little more than a strategy to gather actionable intelligence. The distrust is exacerbated by the potential for relocation with little notice, leaving unfulfilled promises.

Another threat is the militarization of aid operations. Every SSTR project, regardless of military involvement, becomes a legitimate target from the enemy's perspective. This constitutes an even more difficult environment for civilians and government efforts at stability and reconstruction, and creates a potential defeat in the information war when a military sponsored project is attacked.

The Civ-Mil Option

The Civ-Mil option represents the aspirations of a capable and responsive inter-agency force that incorporates the strengths and mitigates the weaknesses inherent in the near-autonomous execution of SSTR tasks by civilians and military organizations. Within this multidisciplinary approach there would be elements of every service and agency. Army Civil Affairs, Navy SeaBee construction teams, tactical and strategic lift assets from all services, and manpower from the Army and Marines would combine with the governance, economic, rule of law, and development expertise provided by the Departments of State, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, and intelligence agencies. This option expands upon the Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept born in Afghanistan in 2003. The design and implementation of PRTs were officially linked to the Coalition's simultaneous announcement that

⁷⁰ Nathan Springer, "Implementing a Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Strategy Northeast Afghanistan, May 07 – July 08," *Small Wars Journal* (1 March 2010): 8, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/377-springer.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2010).

it was moving into Phase IV (reconstruction), enabling military resources to be diverted from the war against terrorism to reconstruction. The overall objective was to expand the legitimacy of the central government regionally by supporting and facilitating reconstruction and contributing to the establishment of security as a byproduct of the delivery of tangible benefits to the population.⁷¹

Within the Civ-Mil option, there are three variants. On one extreme lies the pre-designation of units and agency personnel that will conduct SSTR tasks throughout all phases of the operation.⁷² This would allow for these organizations to focus specifically on SSTR tasks as they prepare for deployment. This variant focuses on administrative and planning efforts. However, it fails to address one of the main weaknesses, unity of command. Though a single authority is designated “in the lead,” there could still be disagreement regarding desired end-states which could cause agencies to pursue their own visions, as no single agency has sufficient leverage to compel any others to follow its lead. Yet another significant weakness is that pre-designation does not equate to co-location for training prior to deployment.

On the opposite side of the spectrum is what Thomas Barnett terms the creation of the System Administrator (SysAdmin) Force. In his book, *The Pentagon’s New Map: Blueprint for Action*, Barnett advocates the creation of a separate peer agency, the “Department of Global Security,” which would bridge the gap between the Departments of War (Defense) and Peace (State).⁷³ This SysAdmin force would combine the expeditionary capabilities and manpower of the military with agency-specific civilian expertise on nation-building and development from other executive departments.

⁷¹Barbara Stapleton, “The Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan: A New Direction?” (June 2003): 4.

⁷²Ellsworth, 9.

⁷³Barnett, 30.

The third option occupies the middle ground between pre-designation of elements that would form an SSTR task force and the creation of the SysAdmin as a separate but equal executive department. It involves creating what Lew Erwin describes as a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) or a Humanitarian Assistance Combatant Command.⁷⁴ This option would take organization a step further than the pre-designation option by assigning both military and civilian personnel to the command but not require the creation of a new executive department. As Erwin explains, this option should: (1) provide clear, task-driven strategic-level statements of intent, responsibility, and authority; (2) enable key agencies to develop relevant expertise at all levels; (3) give agencies operational control over personnel from other agencies to realize true unity of vision and effort; (4) integrate other-agency personnel throughout the combatant commands; and (5) create interagency service career incentives to build a civilian expeditionary capability.⁷⁵

Civ-Mil Option		
Internal	Strengths	Weaknesses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SSTR focus •Self-securing •Organic capabilities •Development Expertise •Planning culture •Unity of command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Implementation cost and timeline •Cultural mismatch
External	Opportunities	Threats
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Operational reach •Link between projects and strategy •Relationship with local government •Legitimacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Militarization of aid efforts •Popular distrust •Operational tempo

⁷⁴Erwin, 67.

⁷⁵Ibid.

The strengths of this option are, by design, a combination of the strengths of the military and civilian options. The Civ-Mil option would have the force structure that gives it the ability to self-secure and the organic capabilities to conduct SSTR tasks ranging from reconstruction to foreign internal defense. The development expertise from civilians would be integrated from the strategic level to the individual executing tasks on the ground as a result of the planning culture and the unity of command. This option would allow for the creation of a Directed Mission Essential Task List (DMETL) focused exclusively on stability operations.

Despite every effort to design a “cure-all,” there are some weaknesses to this variant of the Civ-Mil option. First, it is necessary to recognize that that this organization would need to be created “out of hide” from every executive agency. This involves more than just providing administrative control to DOD or Department of State, but a significant shift in budget and personnel allocations. It is unlikely that such an organization could be created and maintained without legislation. The next issue is that of culture. It took the Goldwater-Nichols Act and nearly twenty years of success and failure to develop a “joint” culture within the DOD. It is unrealistic to believe that a functional inter-agency culture would be quickly developed despite the successes within the PRT model and current efforts to synchronize military and civilian agency actions.

The opportunities for the Civ-Mil option mirror many of those for the civilian and military forces. This organization would have the operational reach of the military, linking projects in previously inaccessible areas to the reconstruction and development strategies developed concurrently with the national, regional and local governments. This would create a SSTR organization with a legitimacy borne from expertise, capabilities, and professionalism.

Unfortunately, in the eyes of the people and our enemies, the military aspect of this organization will dominate. Like the military option, this will serve to militarize all aid projects as it blurs the lines between civilians and military assets doing SSTR tasks. Similarly, there will

always be an element of popular distrust of the motives of a militarized organization regardless of the types of tasks they are performing.

The greatest threat to an organization such as this is the operational tempo. Unlike the application of a conventional military force, it is unlikely that the demand and need for a SSTR capable force would ever relent. The ability to maintain personnel requirements for such an enduring mission would be difficult. For example, it was difficult to fill the civilian requirements for the 2009 “civilian surge” into Afghanistan. Commenting anonymously, a State Department Official stated that filling positions at the end of that first year with new personnel [was] posing enough of a challenge that they [were] considering extending current assignments to two years.⁷⁶

Undoubtedly, an in-depth examination of these SSTR options could fill the pages of this study many times over. The analysis of these three options is limited yet sufficient for the purpose of this project. This chapter reveals a significant weakness within the civilian and civ-mil options, respectively, which make them unfeasible. For the civilian option the issue is security. Within the complex operational environment, motion along the spectrum of conflict is neither unidirectional nor predictable.⁷⁷ With little warning a permissive environment may turn non-permissive severely degrading if not halting civilian operations. A monumental obstacle for an effective Civ-Mil option is simply the creation of that organization. Even if an ad-hoc JTF was constituted far enough in advance to conduct training prior to deployment, the crusade to protect budgetary and personnel allocations combined with allegiances to parent organizations would limit effectiveness. It is issues such as these that led Defense Secretary Robert Gates to conclude: “until our government decides to plus up our civilian agencies . . . soldiers can expect

⁷⁶Kristina Wong, “Afghanistan Civilian Surge Could Last Decade,” abcnews.go.com, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Afghanistan/us-civilian-surge-afghanistan-decade/story?id=9971367> (accessed March 5, 2010).

⁷⁷Ellsworth, 5.

to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All these so-called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy—where they must stay.”⁷⁸

Is CERP Effective?

This question progresses beyond the assumption that if we are doing still doing CERP seven years after its inception, it must be effective. With few exceptions, CERP is effective. Yet, despite the resounding support for CERP, there are still challenges in the development of metrics and assessments to determine how effective the program has been. This difficulty emerges from the disparity between the political, strategic, operational and tactical, and popular views of the definition of “effective” CERP. At the political level, effective CERP ensures taxpayer dollars are spent without waste, fraud or abuse. From a strategic perspective, effective CERP links local stability and reconstruction efforts to regional and national development strategies. At the operational and tactical levels, effective CERP is something that creates a relationship yielding “actionable” intelligence. And, from the view of the affected populace, effective CERP projects improve their quality of life in a timely and sustainable manner. With such diverse characterizations of “effectiveness” the best chance of linking these definitions together is with a bottom-up approach beginning at project selection.

From a political standpoint, effective CERP ensures that American taxpayer dollars are not wasted. In testimony before Congress, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated, “uninterrupted oversight by inspectors general and the Congress – accompanied by adequately staffed quality-control and quality-assurance programs—is essential to ensuring the

⁷⁸U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2007. Accessed through <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches>; last accessed July 22, 2008.

efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars.”⁷⁹ Congress defines effectiveness in terms of inputs and outputs rather than outcomes. For instance, dollars spent on constructing a school (input), number of schools built (outputs) verses number of children educated (outcomes). As a result, inputs and outputs are a central focus in the mandated quarterly reports to the Congressional oversight committee and the primary focus for training resource managers, PPOs, and PAs.

At the strategic level, effective CERP compliments other international and U.S. Government Reconstruction and Development funds within a comprehensive strategy. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction explains in *Hard Lessons in Reconstruction*, that for brigades, PRTs, and PRDCs [Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees], CERP served as the bridge between the often lagging capital expenditures by reconstruction funds and the reestablishment of basic services and quality of life for the Iraqi people.⁸⁰ In an interview, after serving as the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan 2003-2005, Lieutenant General (LTG) Barno described CERP as “an incredibly powerful weapon in the toolbox to be able to deliver immediate aid, immediate dollars, through the Afghan government, typically local governments, to be able to trade quick-impact projects on the ground.”⁸¹ CERP’s effectiveness requires the coordination of all grass-roots efforts to ensure they fit into national and regional development strategies without the duplication of efforts while simultaneously ensuring projects are complete and sustainable over the long term.

⁷⁹U.S. Congress, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, February 2, 2009, 6, http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_09-001T.pdf (accessed March 10, 2010).

⁸⁰Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction. *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*. (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 2009), 280.

⁸¹*Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan 2003-2005*, 24.

At the operational and tactical levels, leaders consistently use CERP as a tool to separate the enemy from the local population. This entails clear guidance on the use of money from the commander and a deliberate targeting process, that includes CERP with other lethal and non-lethal effects, focused on the desired end conditions for the unit's area of operations. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Tim McGuire, commander of the 1/508th Parachute Infantry Regiment spoke about the effects of building roads in his area of operations (AO):

With CERP, we were able to build these cobblestone roads, which, to me, was the equivalent of dropping a bomb on an insurgent training camp because word quickly spread of these cobblestone roads, and out in the hinterlands, where the insurgency still had some support, you get the locals asking, "Hey, when are we going to get a paved road?" And it was very easy, to say, "You can't get the road because it's not safe enough to get the engineers out here. We need intel on who these insurgents are."⁸²

Effective CERP at the operational and tactical levels hinges on the development of relationships and consistently engaging local leaders. These relationships yield respect, trust, and confidence between locals and operational forces. Developing these relationships is often termed "winning the hearts and minds." Given the value placed upon mutual respect, trust and confidence, local leaders view insurgent and terrorist activity as a blight on their honor. MAJ Nathan Springer recounts, "Development dollars opened the door to a large number of anti-government areas and villages in my AO."⁸³

The population does not view CERP dollars as anything more than an vehicle to improve quality of life in a manner that the government and enemy have not previously been able to accomplish. Recounting how the situation turned for the better in the village of Saw, MAJ Springer noted that the Afghan National Army identified that education was important to the villagers. Truckloads of CERP-funded school supplies arrived to ensure the children had the

⁸²*Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan 2003-2005*, 411.

⁸³Springer, 8.

materials they needed to get an education. Soon after the delivery of school supplies, the village elders delivered 100 hand-written thank you notes from the students. This meeting served as the first step in rebuilding a pro-government attitude in Saw.⁸⁴ Improving quality of life is not the only measurement of effectiveness in the eyes of the people. The responsive nature of CERP allows for promises to rapidly transform into credibility. Kifah Mohammad Kato, Director of the Sinjar General Hospital near the Iraq-Syria border, stated that a week after he identified the needs of the pediatric wing of his hospital, a Humvee pulled up with the first installment of \$9,600 in cash to fix the wing. Within four more weeks, the building was rebuilt and refurnished, complete with fuzzy blankets in primary colors and Mickey and Minnie Mouse decorations. He was amazed at the timeliness of delivery: “It happened so fast I almost couldn’t believe it.”⁸⁵

The examples above are not intended to imply that members of Congress and senior leaders do not recognize that, at the operational and tactical levels, CERP projects create relationships that yield intelligence. Nor do leaders at the lower levels fail to understand that CERP is just a small piece in a larger development puzzle which represents an investment by the American taxpayer. Likewise, the people who receive CERP funded projects understand that the efforts to fund and implement CERP projects are not merely to ease suffering and improve quality of life. The key is connecting these concepts of effectiveness together. That linkage should occur at the genesis of each project when CERP practitioners select the right projects.

Are operational forces being adequately trained to perform CERP?

In terms of using money as a “weapon system,” are the commander’s designated CERP practitioners “departing the wire” after zeroing and qualifying with CERP, just as they have with

⁸⁴Springer, 8.

⁸⁵Ariana Cha, “Military Puts Funds to Swift Use Rebuilding,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 2003, A1.

their M4 rifles? To answer this question it is necessary to determine what training is occurring and whether that training is designed to yield the effectiveness described in the last chapter. To answer these supporting questions, this study examines the programs of instruction in the primary military education (PME) system, MAAWS policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, training guidance, and the results of a random electronic survey of Majors attending Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on the Commander's Emergency Response Program.

One of the goals of the survey was to identify what training respondents had received and who operational commanders were designating to identify and nominate CERP projects. Approximately 60% indicated that they did not receive any training on CERP before they deployed or after arriving in theater. Within that same group of respondents, 58% indicated that platoon leaders were responsible for identifying CERP projects, 75% indicated that company and battery commanders identified CERP projects, and 80% indicated that projects were identified by battalion and squadron commanders or their staff.⁸⁶ The survey indicated that a preponderance of CERP efforts fell on the shoulders of company grade and junior field grade officers.

A review of the programs of instruction (POI) within the PME for majors and below reinforced these survey results. The Basic Officer Leadership Course II allocated one week to stability and defensive operations. Money as a weapon system is not part of the POI unless an instructor includes personal examples of operational experiences with CERP to personalize the instruction.⁸⁷ Similarly, in the Maneuver Captains Career Course, of the 728.5 hours of training,

⁸⁶See Annex A "Commander's Emergency Response Survey (herein after referred to as CERP Survey)," questions 1, 2, 9, 10 and 11.

⁸⁷John Holden, "Basic Officer Leader Course II," U.S. Army Infantry Homepage, <https://www.benning.army.mil/BOLC/Syllabus> (accessed January 12, 2010). A follow-up telephone conversation with CSM (R) Holden, the course manager, indicated that instructors often used personal examples of operational experiences to reinforce concepts. The use of money by operational forces, though

84.5 were dedicated to Stability Operations. None were specifically dedicated to use of money as a weapon system.⁸⁸ The Intermediate Level Education POI does not formally address CERP or MAAWS with the exception of a few elective courses. Currently within the PME, education and training regarding CERP occurs only if the instructors and students integrate personal experiences.

Given that CERP has not been integrated into the PME, an examination of pre-mission training is necessary. This includes home-station and mission readiness exercises during the ready/train phase of the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. According to *Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS): MNC-I CJ8 SOP*, the standard operating procedures for the use of MAAWS in Iraq, and the Afghanistan theater's equivalent publication *Money As A Weapon System-Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): USFOR-A Pub 1-06*, subordinate unit commanders are responsible for ensuring that they have trained and appointed with written orders unit paying agents (PAs) and project purchasing officers (PPOs).⁸⁹ The training for PAs and PPOs promotes compliance with programs, processes, and reporting requirements designed to ensure that requirements are properly validated and that resources are applied efficiently and effectively. The goal is to allow commanders flexibility in CERP usage while maintaining adequate controls to provide reasonable assurance against fraud, waste, and abuse.⁹⁰ No additional CERP training is dictated.

not a formal part of the instruction, was often discussed during the Stability Operations and Defense week of instruction, or during Platoon Trainer Time.

⁸⁸“MCCC Draft POI dated 22 May 2009,” U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (TRADOC approved copy retained on file with the author). A telephone interview with MAJ Alexis Rivera-Espada, Operations Officer for the Directorate of Training at the Maneuver Center of Excellence indicated that CERP was not part of the formal POI, but consistently referenced during the stability operations training as a result of the operational experiences of the students and instructors.

⁸⁹Headquarters, United States Forces - Afghanistan, *Money As A Weapon System-Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): USFOR-A Pub 1-06* (Kabul, Afghanistan: USFOR-A, 15 May 2009), 101.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 5.

During mission readiness exercises (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), trainers teach the campaign approach to MAAWS. There are two training audiences. Commanders and their staffs receive the “executive level” course focused on issuing clear guidance and ensuring CERP focuses on nested, mutually supporting, and lasting effects. The “operator level” course is designed for civil affairs elements, PRT members, and those individuals brigade combat team and task force commanders have designated as their resource managers, PPOs, and PAs.⁹¹ Training for operational forces during the same MRE focuses on the DMETL identified by the theater commanders.

After assessing the training in the PME and the training required for units before transfer of authority for operations within their areas of operation, there appears to be a disconnect between required CERP training and the training needed for operational forces to effectively employ CERP. Platoon leaders, company commanders and battalion level staff members interact with the population on a daily basis. Thus, they serve as the primary means to identify and execute CERP projects. Despite this, however, there is no directed training to support this task. Analysis of training guidance, CERP survey results, and standard operating procedures for the employment of CERP reinforce this perceived gap between requirements and training.

In the COMISAF/USFOR-A⁹² COIN Training Guidance, General McChrystal asserts that CERP is an important enabler that requires expertise in order to assist the population. He states that in order to rapidly execute CERP projects, he expects commanders and their staffs from the company to the brigade level to understand the nomination and boarding process. He emphasizes that commanders must ensure that they have an appropriate number of project

⁹¹MAJ Andrew McConnell, Senior Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations Trainer/Mentor, JRTC, 2010. E-mail interview by author. March 14, 2010.

⁹²Commander International Security and Assistance Forces, and United States Forces – Afghanistan.

managers, paying agents and contractors to be able to effectively execute development operations.⁹³ The COIN guidance recognizes that CERP occurs at tactical and operational level, yet the focus appears to be on the procedural aspects of the program rather than the achievement of the effects he desires.

When asked “what training would you consider necessary to effectively employ CERP?” a consistent theme among the participants in the ILE CERP survey, was ensuring CERP practitioners understood the legal aspects of the program and the procedures that resource managers, PPOs, and PAs must complete in the contracting process.⁹⁴ Surprisingly, these responses focused heavily on administrative and legal aspects of CERP rather than the tactical and operational employment of the program to yield desired effects.

Why would officers who predominantly served in operational assignments focus so heavily on the procedural and legal aspects of CERP? Though the MAAWS policies in Iraq and Afghanistan recognize project selection as a step in the CERP process, the primary focus is on project nomination, approval, and reporting. The Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) MAAWS policy introduction states that HQDA uses quarterly CERP reports to defend the program to Congress. This requires that reported data is accurate, up-to-date and submitted on time.⁹⁵ Additionally, the burden of CERP falls on the shoulders of the assigned PAs and PPOs. Statements within the policy reflect a heavy focus. For example:

If the PA fails to abide by applicable regulations and procedures, the PA can be held liable for any losses of funds and may be subject to administrative actions or criminal prosecution.

The PPO manages the project to completion. Lack of ability does not excuse failure to adequately supervise a project and ensure the SoW [Statement of Work] requirements are

⁹³McChrystal, 4.

⁹⁴CERP Survey, question 8.

⁹⁵Headquarters, Multinational Corps-Iraq. *Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS): MNC-I CJ8 SOP*. (Baghdad, Iraq: MNC-I CJ8, January 2009), 4.

met. Failure can result in the PPO being found negligent and liable for any cost, damage, or loss of life.⁹⁶

This guidance concentrates on “what not to do” and how to submit projects and track progress, creating an environment where the effects achieved by CERP are vastly subordinate to meeting the mandated quarterly requirements. These policies and the supporting training requirements cause operational forces to focus more on tracking inputs and outputs than achieving their commander’s desired outcomes.

The theater commands are not responsible for this environment. CERP is a high-visibility program with a substantial dedicated budget. The price of flexible implementation is an extensive oversight process. Protecting the funding of the program has driven much of the training for CERP since its inception. The perceived disconnect between training and requirements stems from the measurement of CERP’s effectiveness by politicians. Congress’ perceived focus on inputs and outputs rather than outcomes dictates a series of measurements that necessitate detailed project proposals and top-down management of project completion.

Proper financial oversight and management of CERP is essential to the survival of the program. Training in these areas ensures the ability to account for money spent and to better track projects throughout the theater. However, proper fiscal management and project tracking represent just the first step to effectively employing CERP. The next step is training our CERP practitioners to identify projects that will yield the desired outcomes.

⁹⁶Headquarters, United States Forces - Afghanistan, *Money As A Weapon System-Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): USFOR-A Pub 1-06*, 102-108.


How should operational forces be trained to perform CERP?

Thus far, this study has explained why CERP is necessary, the development and evolution of the program, determined that CERP is not only appropriate but a necessary task for the military, examined if it is effective, and assessed the current training and policy guidance for operational forces who employ the program. The previous chapters represent a sequential logic that leads to the assertion that in order to be effective, CERP must: *Identify* correctly the needs of the local populace, *Nest* within the national development strategy, *Validate* legitimate local power structures, *Employ* local labor and supplies, be *Sustainable* by local government after completion, be *Timely* in both initiation and completion, and analyze intended and unintended *Effects*. The elements of the INVEST-E methodology, when properly considered, generate outcomes that serve as the link between the popular, operational and tactical and strategic views of effectiveness. This, in combination with current training requirements for PPOs, PAs and resource managers, will improve program effectiveness.

Before detailing each feature of the INVEST-E construct, it is necessary to identify the training audience and when the training must occur. The methodology is designed for the company grade and junior field grade officers who represent the operational reach of the U.S. military. In performing their duties, these junior level leaders develop a situational understanding of the underlying conditions affecting the population. In many situations their presence represents the only source of governance, development, and future prosperity. Their ability to effectively employ CERP funds is a critical element of success. The INVEST-E concept should be immediately integrated into pre-deployment training, but ensuring its enduring impact requires its integration into the stability operations program of instructions within the PME

It is also necessary to illustrate the importance of Strategic Communications (StratCom). Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, remarked that “actions speak louder than words.

Credibility and trust are key. The United States undermines its own power when our government fails to live up to its promises and our nation's values.”⁹⁷ Though it is not part of the INVEST-E construct it is a thread of continuity through each element of the methodology. So often, StratCom is an afterthought. Its placement here emphasizes its importance in generating the outcomes that define effective CERP. It is a continuous requirement which propagates successes locally, nationally and internationally, thus marginalizing enemy efforts to undermine development efforts. “Actions speak louder than words, but they are interpreted in a highly contested marketplace of ideas. We live in a world where legitimacy and perceived intent, not just actions or raw capabilities, matter.”⁹⁸



⁹⁷Kristin Lord, “Public Engagement 101: What Strategic Communication Is, Isn’t, and Should Be,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 56 (1st quarter 2010): 6-9, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i56/14.pdf (accessed March 13, 2010).

⁹⁸Ibid.

Identifies correctly the needs of the Populace

Though applying the INVEST-E methodology is not a sequential process, developing an understanding of the social dynamics, structural conditions, and needs of the local populace is the logical first step. In a recent guidebook on employing economic development to support stability published by RAND, the authors describe the huge trash problem that developed in the aftermath of major combat operations in Iraq. With the collapse of Saddam's regime, local services had halted. Many of the trash collectors were missing, dumpsters and trash trucks were damaged or had disappeared and trash was beginning to pile up creating sanitation and safety hazards. Using CERP funds, military units hired contractors to build large four-sided concrete structures to serve as collection points for the trash. As soon as construction completed, displaced Iraqis began to occupy them. One family of thirty-five people moved into an unfinished structure and completed the roof over their "new house" within twenty-four hours. Inadvertently the units had met one of the most pressing needs facing the populace, having a roof over their heads.⁹⁹ This anecdote, though a success story in the eyes of the populace, shows a failure to identify the needs of the people before initiating the project. There are four considerations when identifying the needs of the populace:

- Engagement with the local populace
- "Needs Analysis"
- "Best Practice" pitfalls
- Leverage honor to develop local ownership

Engagement with the local populace is critical to identifying the most pressing needs. Depending on the operational environment, this engagement should occur on many levels.

⁹⁹Keith Crane et al, *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 17, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR633.pdf (accessed March 11, 2010).

Formal engagements with established government officials and tribal councils allow formalized and traditional social structures to identify desired projects. Informal engagements with local people are possible with every patrol through a neighborhood, down a busy street, or in the local market. Understanding the popular dynamics may cause the engagement of government officials in one town, a tribal council in an adjacent village, and a religious leader in the next village. However, successfully identifying the power brokers among the people does not necessarily equate to identifying the needs of the populace. An element of caution must be present in each engagement. What CERP practitioners view as little more than a discussion may be viewed as a commitment by the local populace. Expectation management of the local people should be a focal point of the engagement.

CERP practitioners must conduct a “needs analysis.” In many cases units learn this from trial and error. In the beginning, they do the projects they think are needed. Next, they do the projects that the people said they wanted. Then, they do projects based upon what the people say they need. Finally, they do projects that emerge from their analysis of the projects the people stated they needed. This sequence of events represents the learning curve many untrained units experience with CERP as they seek effectiveness. The “needs analysis” seeks to identify the root causes of instability. The root causes are the grievances that undermine the legitimacy of the government and give traction to anti-government elements that thrive on instability.¹⁰⁰

CERP practitioners must avoid the pitfalls of a “best practice” mentality. Successful projects may appear to be a solution in an adjacent province, district or village. However, engagement with the local population, an accurate needs analysis and a thorough understanding

¹⁰⁰COIN Training Center - Afghanistan, “District Stability Framework” (DSF_Introduction.pptx), Counterinsurgency, Security Force Assistance, Stability Operations Website, https://coin.harmonieweb.org/COIN_DCO_Webcasts/25Feb2010_Monthly/25Feb2010_COINSOSFA_DC_O_Packet.zip (accessed March 13, 2010).

of the local perspectives are the ingredients that combine to form success. It is essential for CERP practitioners to understand the underlying principles of why it worked and what would have stopped it from working well. Only then can CERP practitioners transfer the learning, not by copying “best practice”, but by adapting these principles to the local context.¹⁰¹

Generating local ownership or “buy-in” of the project is essential for the long-term success of reconstruction and development efforts. Identifying the needs of the populace is but one of the INVEST-E elements that is necessary to ensure the people view the project as their own. In many cultures, if the local leaders have identified a project as essential, once the project commences, personal honor is tied to the completion of that project. Their honor will compel them to ensure nothing within their control derails the project’s success. However, failure of operational forces to meet obligations in support of that project will be seen as dishonouring them.

Nests within the national development strategy

In testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, the Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction stated that “shortfalls on the reconstruction side stem, to a significant degree, from the lack of a system within the U.S. government for managing contingency relief and reconstruction operations.”¹⁰² His statement specifically focuses on the disunity between Department of State, USAID, and U.S. Military elements focused on reconstruction and development. In most cases, the addition of Host Nation, IGO, and NGO

¹⁰¹Eve Mitleton, “The Practical Application of Complexity Theory in the Public and Private Sector,” Overseas Development Institute, http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/events/Complexity/docs/Keynote_EveMitletonKelly.ppt (accessed March 13, 2010).

¹⁰²U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Effective Counterinsurgency: How the Use and Misuse of Reconstruction Funding Affects the War Effort in Iraq and Afghanistan*, March 25, 2009, 5, http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_09-002T.pdf (accessed March 10, 2010).

efforts exacerbate the synchronization problems. As an example, U.S. civil affairs personnel were working with the Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs on the construction of an administrative building. When the project lead requested approval from the provincial governor, he rejected the project since USAID had already begun construction on an administration building for the Ministry of Women's Affairs.¹⁰³ In this situation, the failure to nest efforts within a larger development strategy resulted in lost time and effort. Similar missteps resulted in a loss of money, resources, and credibility. To ensure that CERP efforts are nested within the national development strategy, there are three considerations:

- Unity of Effort
- Compliment vs. Compete
- Legitimize the host nation government

SSTR tasks are performed by a diverse group of entities often possessing vastly different priorities and visions of success. Operational forces tend to focus CERP efforts on short-term projects that improve the local security situation. These efforts may destabilize the medium and long range efforts by the PRT or USAID.¹⁰⁴ Coordination through the higher headquarters, district support teams (DSTs) and PRTs will ensure that tasks, purposes and end states of SSTR efforts are nested. Unity of effort yields coordination and cooperation toward common SSTR objectives.

CERP projects represent a small piece of the larger development strategy. Resources and funding are limited, so projects must complement adjacent efforts rather than compete with them. LTC Augustine, Commander of the Lashkar Gah PRT in Afghanistan illustrated the importance of this concept:

¹⁰³Keith Crane et al., 34.

¹⁰⁴Timothy Furin, "Legally Funding Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," *The Army Lawyer* (October 2008): 21.

We would supplement what was going on. Say, USAID built a hospital, but the hospital didn't have the proper equipment so they could run the hospital. USAID didn't normally provide hospital equipment, but perhaps we could with CERP funds. Same thing in schools. USAID might build schools and basic buildings and stuff like that, but we would potentially use the money to buy desks and chairs and books, whatever, or coordinate with other NGOs to get that kind of stuff in.¹⁰⁵

Dialogue and coordination between development agencies with the AO are essential to ensure that efforts are not duplicated.

Nesting your efforts within the national development strategy establishes a connection between a distant national government and pressing local needs. During engagements at the lowest levels CERP practitioners should ensure the people understand that the military plays a supporting role to host nation and civilian assistance providers for SSTR efforts. Coordinated efforts within a national development strategy legitimize the government in the eyes of the people. This legitimacy is reinforced when the construction of a CERP funded school coincides with the arrival of teachers recently trained at a provincial training center.

Validates legitimate local power structures

In a post-conflict environment the international community can impose stability, but only the host nation population can create sustainable peace. Long-term stability is dependent on rebuilding and reforming existing formal and informal structures and systems. This is often more palatable to the host nation population as compared to the introduction of an unfamiliar model that does not reflect local customs and norms.¹⁰⁶ Since basic services and infrastructure are essential to meet the popular needs in conflict and post-conflict environments, the people will often support whoever is able to consistently provide for those needs. This provider may be the

¹⁰⁵Keith Crane et al., 444.

¹⁰⁶United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 3-14.

legitimate government, a warlord, or an insurgent force. If a local government is in place, the secondary goal of SSTR operations should be to enhance the reputation of the government.¹⁰⁷

CERP practitioners must seek to validate legitimate power structures in the eyes of the populace.

There are three considerations to validating legitimate structures:

- Empower through success
- Marginalize rival actors
- Leverage legitimacy to develop local ownership

So often, conflict diminishes or prevents the ability of the government to provide for the needs of the people. CERP efforts should attribute successes to the formal and informal power structures. Being viewed by the people as instrumental in the development and execution of a project that successfully addresses popular needs builds confidence in local figures and institutions. This confidence enables capacity and facilitates enduring stability. In the Second Battle of Fallujah, Marine Regimental Combat Team 1 recognized that local civil, religious, tribal, and business leaders were powerful allies. Their position and status gave them power and influence over a broad audience. Assigning the success of high-impact projects to these leaders enhanced their credibility in the eyes of the population which attracted them and their followers to the coalition.¹⁰⁸ Local security forces should also be integrated into successful project implementation. Security forces that support the local government will strengthen the government's position if they provide humanitarian assistance in a quick and effective manner.¹⁰⁹

MAJ Springer, in describing his difficulties in the Afghan village of Saw, successfully utilized Afghan National Army (ANA) as the link to develop relationships and improve

¹⁰⁷The primary goal is to establish or maintain a safe and secure environment. Keith Crane et al., 3, 51.

¹⁰⁸DeFrancisci, 24.

¹⁰⁹Keith Crane et al., 38.

education. “The Afghan National Army proved critical to building a relationship with the village. The ANA went to Saw and began building relationships with the elders. They found out the elders of Saw were focused on bringing education to their children. After learning this, our unit sent truckloads of school supplies to Saw.”¹¹⁰ Associations with projects that address the needs of the people rebuild credibility, trust, and ultimately legitimacy.

In many cases the conflict has displaced or rendered irrelevant the legitimate power structures that represent civil control. In the absence of legitimate civilian control, rival actors such as warlords, corrupt leaders, and criminals assume positions of authority. The execution of CERP projects in these circumstances risks enhancing the credibility and reputation of these individuals. CERP practitioners should develop strategies to undermine these actors.

Colonel Lamm, LTG Barno’s Chief of Staff, described successful integration of CERP to dislocate Ismail Khan, an entrenched warlord, in Herat, Afghanistan. Fifteen thousand Afghan National Army and Police deployed to Herat, placed Ismail Kahn under house arrest and captured his thugs. The new governor arrived and announced that the long awaited Herat Burn Center for Women would soon be completed. The responsiveness of CERP allowed for the rapid construction and opening of the new facility, empowering the new governor who provided what the warlord could not.¹¹¹ Warlords and criminals are not the only rival actors. When a single political actor or contractor manages large or multiple infrastructure projects, the wealth generated and control of access to the benefits of that project can spawn corruption and reinforce loyalties that undermine government control. CERP practitioners can protect against this by

¹¹⁰Springer, 8.

¹¹¹Keith Crane et al., 139.

ensuring competitive bidding where possible, and where only one contractor is available, by tracing supply chains and profit investments.¹¹²

Validating legitimate power structures is the second aspect of INVEST-E that contributes to a sense of ownership by the local populace. Involving the legitimate leaders in the development of projects provides them with control over the process that is visible to the local populace. This involvement not only reinforces their ability to govern in the eyes of the people, but also mitigates the risk of building on disputed land or the development of unrealistic timetables.¹¹³ MAJ Springer understood that control of projects in the hands of legitimate authorities developed a sense of ownership. He recalled that,

In both Naray and Ghaziabad the elders voted on and created development and infrastructure priority lists for their districts. To ensure equitability and trust between the tribes, we had the elder hired project engineers attend the weekly shura meetings, give a progress report to the elders on the project, and answer any questions they might have. Additionally, the project engineer would receive payment for the project at the 25%, 50%, 75%, and project complete stages at the district shura meeting after the tribal elders had inspected the projects progress and approved payment.¹¹⁴

The success of these projects enhanced the legitimacy of the shura which engendered a sense of ownership in the projects.

Employs local labor and supplies

Between June and October 2003, U.S. military units used the newly created CERP to conduct more than 11,000 projects to benefit the Iraqi people. These projects amounted to approximately \$78.6 million in goods and services, mostly from local sources. Thousands in Baghdad received a daily wage to clean streets, alleys, buildings, and public spaces, far exceeding

¹¹²Keith Crane et al., 52, 119.

¹¹³Patrick Donahue and Michael Fenzel, "Combatting a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan," in "Counterinsurgency Reader II," special issue, *Military Review* (August 2008): 33.

¹¹⁴Springer, 8.

what U.S. forces could do alone.¹¹⁵ These projects created jobs for disaffected military-aged males, infused money into a stagnant economy, improved the quality of life for Iraqis, and served as a source of hope for better things to come. In this example, the intent was to create mass public-works projects. Similar results are possible, though to a lesser extent, in even the smallest CERP projects. Conflict interrupts every aspect of the marketplace from agriculture, trade, transport, and industry. After a conflict, the labor force typically lacks workers with advanced education or highly technical skills.¹¹⁶ However, every labor and commodity market is unique and will respond to conflict accordingly. CERP practitioners must develop an understanding of the marketplace in which they will initiate projects. In order to effectively employ labor and local materials into CERP execution there are three considerations:

- Promote local economic capacity
- Provide alternatives to insurgent/illegal activities
- Leverage pride to develop local ownership

Within the AO, commanders and their CERP practitioners need to know what economic sectors are most important in terms of income generation and employment. In urban areas, trade and transport may be the most important, whereas rural inhabitants will likely live off the land.

Recognizing the impact of development funds on local economies, the Afghan Ministry of Finance stated that “local procurement both encourages capacity-development in the private and non-profit sectors, and acts as an aid multiplier by directing more assistance to the domestic economy.” This comment referred to the implementation of projects, in particular, for

¹¹⁵Martins, 48.

¹¹⁶United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 9-158.

infrastructure and supplies for civilian and military activities.¹¹⁷ Considering this, CERP projects should serve as a catalyst, both directly and indirectly, to encourage the creation of new businesses and jobs and increase supply chain capacity for raw materials without inflating costs. A resource-intensive project that inflates the cost of raw materials may cause a backlash among the local populace thereby undermining the benefits of the project.

Insurgents and criminal elements recruit those that are most disaffected by the economy; military-aged males. Labor-intensive CERP projects counter that recruitment by reducing the availability of unemployed military-aged males. Quite simply, a man cannot hold a shovel and an AK-47 at the same time. While seemingly intuitive, the impact of labor intensive development projects on insurgent recruiting was the subject of a study performed by the Institute of Defense Analysis in London. The study found that “while the amount spent and the number of projects initiated has no effect on violence, a key result was that spending devoted to labor-intensive projects was associated with a decrease in violence. Specifically, an additional 10% spent on employment is associated with an approximately 10% reduction in violence.” In addition, researchers found that providing labor intensive alternatives to insurgency caused insurgent groups to shift away from labor-intensive attacks to capital-intensive attacks.¹¹⁸ If purely labor-intensive attacks were considered, labor-intensive development projects resulted in a 15-20% decline in labor-intensive forms of violence. Ultimately, in communities with relatively few

¹¹⁷*Prioritizing Aid Effectiveness: Taking Forward the Afghanistan Compact and Paris Declaration Commitments*, Final Draft. (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, 2007), 4.

¹¹⁸Labor-intensive attacks refer to person on person violence, capital-intensive attacks refer to the use of improvised explosive devices to carry out attacks.

economic opportunities, the introduction of legal labor had a dramatic effect on illegal labor markets.¹¹⁹

Employing local labor and local supplies can leverage pride, personal investment, and help develop a sense of ownership. Placing local leaders in a position to select projects and find contractors, laborers and suppliers, creates personal “buy-in” for those leaders. COL John Charlton, speaking about his experiences in Ramadi, Iraq said, “all of our projects used local contractors and were planned with community leaders. This meant that the Iraqis were major stakeholders in these projects and had a vested interest in making sure they were completed. Because of this, none of our projects were attacked by terrorists.”¹²⁰ Placing the power to hire and fire contractors, laborers and suppliers in the hands of the local leaders forces them to provide quality control for projects under their care. With this amount of authority, comes the investment of personal pride.

Is Sustainable by local government after completion

Failure to plan for the sustainment of a project after completion has accounted for much of the waste in CERP. This feature of the CERP methodology requires detailed interaction with local leaders. In many cases it will serve as the discriminator for many projects deemed “necessary” by the populace. For example, a brigade combat team (BCT) installed water purification units throughout Dhi Qar province in Iraq. These units successfully reduced water-borne illnesses and infant mortality. However, to keep the units running, trained technicians, replacement parts, and coordination with the Iraqi government would be necessary. The BCT

¹¹⁹Matthew Hansen, Radha Iyengar and Jonathan Monten, *Building Peace: The Impact of Reconstruction Spending on the Labor Market for Insurgents* (London: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2009), 5-6.

¹²⁰Dana Hedgepeth and Sarah Cohen, Money as a Weapon, Washington Post, August 11, 2008, p. A1.

coordinated to hand off the project to a local PRT when they rotated back home. The PRT then worked to staff the units with technicians and link them in to the Iraqi government supply system. Coordination and effective assignment of tasks and resources resulted in a successful project.¹²¹

Addressing sustainability requires a long-term perspective on the employment of a program designed to have immediate impact. In many cases units do not look past the ribbon cutting on a project. Yet, the construction or initial purchase likely represents only a small percentage of the total cost during the project life. In order to prevent an un-sustained project from serving as a monument to failure, CERP practitioners must address the following sustainment considerations during project selection:

- Plan for operations and maintenance after transition
- Develop capacities in people and systems
- Leverage commitment to develop local ownership

Every project requires planning for operations and maintenance once the contractor has completed construction or made delivery. Detailing the requirements during the planning phase identifies long term costs and assigns responsibilities to the local populace. Combined Task Force (CTF) Devil, recounted their experiences with a CERP project designed to provide power generation in Sharana, the capitol of Paktika province. The unit failed to discuss operations and maintenance of the generator before initiating the project. The system was successfully installed and provided electricity throughout Sharana. However, once the tank of U.S. supplied diesel fuel ran out, the lights in Sharana went out as well.¹²² The price of CTF Devil's oversight was embarrassment to the U.S. military and a disappointment to the people of Sharana. It illustrates

¹²¹Keith Crane et al., 43.

¹²²Patrick Donahue and Michael Fenzel, 33.

the consequences of failing to determine who will operate and maintain the project after completion.

In his testimony before Congress, Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, stated that “developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as bricks and mortar.”¹²³ While he was referring to the institutionalization of programs such as CERP, the same notion holds true when considering the local population’s ability to sustain CERP projects after completion. There exists a tendency to focus exclusively on construction projects whose completion represents a tangible output of the CERP expenditure. CERP practitioners must focus their analysis beyond creating a physical structure and look at the systems and human capital that might allow existing processes to function more effectively. The development of worker training programs, the establishment of routine maintenance systems, and the development of management and business systems focused on efficiency and throughput are examples of CERP projects that develop capacities.¹²⁴

This aspect of INVEST-E is the last directly focused on developing a sense of ownership from the local populace. Discussing project sustainability as an aspect of project selection with local leaders allows CERP practitioners to get commitment to the project before committing the first dollar. However, seeking local commitment is not just focused at the lowest levels. For example, CERP projects designed to improve education or access to medical care may require the construction of a school or clinic. The local leaders may understand and agree to the required conditions to sustain the project, but without commitment from the relevant national level ministry and leaders at the provincial and district levels, the absence of supplies and trained staff may derail the best conceived plans.

¹²³U.S. Congress, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *HARD LESSONS: THE IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE*, 4.

¹²⁴Keith Crane et al., 52.

Is Timely in both initiation and completion

In the legislation that authorized the use of U.S. taxpayer dollars to fund CERP, Congress described CERP as “enabling military commanders in Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people.”¹²⁵ Understanding that the responsive nature of the program was critical to successes in Iraq led them to eliminate many requirements listed in the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) that impeded rapid execution by other development funds. MAJ Widmann addresses this specifically, stating “largescale reconstruction projects have not offered short term, tangible improvements for most Iraqis; US delays present an advantage to its fourth generation adversaries in the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds”¹²⁶ Key words within the legislation, “urgent” and “immediately,” illustrate why the ability to initiate and complete CERP projects in a timely manner is an integral aspect of the program. CERP practitioners should bear the following considerations in mind when selecting projects:

- Achieve expectations
- Develop credibility

In a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on better project selection for CERP, commanders reported that they found projects that were executed by previous units in various states of completion such as: completed but not sustained by the Iraqi government, vandalized, or nonexistent.¹²⁷ These units had initiated projects with long completion times that never were finished. The units rotated out of theater or operational requirements required them to

¹²⁵Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹²⁶Robert Widmann, “The Commanders Emergency Response Program: Employing Economic Power Against Fourth Generation Foes in Iraq” (master's thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 2005), 9.

¹²⁷U. S. Government Accountability Office, *GAO-08-736R Military Operations*, 5.

reposition elsewhere. Not only did these projects fail to meet local expectations, but they served as a constant reminder of ineptitude. LTC Hunter, Commander of the Gardez, Afghanistan PRT in 2003 to 2004, recalled that projects, whether constructing a well or a school had a six-month timeline from project identification to completion. He stated, “one of the biggest challenges I had there was managing expectations of the local populace.”¹²⁸ CERP practitioners must recognize that in an environment recovering from conflict, project timelines must account for delays, disruptions and setbacks. Extended project time lines risk incompleteness if operational requirements necessitate movement to another location or falling through the cracks during transfer of authority with the incoming unit. “Immediate” is a relative term, but selecting projects that have a short time horizon will ensure that units meet local expectations.

Addressing urgent humanitarian needs develops credibility among the populace. Echoing this assertion, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, states: “[F]ocus on rapid results, while understanding the impact on longer-term goals. Speedy commencement of assistance and the ability to deliver quick, observable, high-impact results establishes credibility.”¹²⁹ When dealing with the population, the dominant U.S. military narrative centers around being there to help the people. CERP is the tool that allows the reinforcement of that narrative with actions. MAJ Nathan Springer’s experiences in the village of Saw highlights the importance of timely use of CERP to develop credibility. The elders in Saw remarked that “when they had openly talked with Americans in the past, lots had been promised and nothing had ever been delivered.” In response, projects in Saw became the priority. In a four month period, his unit began construction on a

¹²⁸ *Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan 2003-2005*, 494.

¹²⁹ United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 5-31.

bridge, clinic, and school.¹³⁰ The ability to quickly implement projects to address the needs of the village created instant credibility and a dramatic change in attitude towards U.S. forces.

Analyze intended and unintended *Effects*.

Operational forces implementing CERP projects must understand the effects of these projects on a complex and adaptive operational environment. The complexity emerges as the requirements of full spectrum operations dictate the integration of security, counter terror, and counter-insurgency operations with stability operations to enhance governance, economic development, basic services, and rule of law. The environment adapts to these efforts, revealing cooperation and competition, allies and opportunists, successes and failures. So many variables demand an analysis of a project's intended and unintended effects. When assessing these effects, CERP practitioners should review the following considerations:

- Inputs
- Outputs
- Outcomes

Assessing the inputs refers to the effects created by efforts and materials used to initiate the project. CERP practitioners must ask relevant questions such as: What impacts will engagement with local civil, tribal, religious leaders, businessmen, and security forces have on the operating environment? And, how will an influx of money to local contractors, suppliers, and workers influence the local economy?

LTC Leonard DeFrancisi described some of these effects in the aftermath of the Second Battle of Fallujah. Marines utilized a “small-project approach” to CERP, creating more opportunities to constructively engage civilians and promote positive perceptions. The frequency

¹³⁰Springer, 8.

of civilian engagements under good circumstances helped build relationships that often yielded actionable intelligence. The Marines heavily utilized \$200 solatia (compensation) payments. They provided compensation for battle damage to over 33,000 Iraqis in a one-week period. This influx of cash helped foster goodwill, jump-started the economy and the rebuilding effort, and focused the people's energy on reconstruction instead of causing more trouble.¹³¹

Inputs can also have a detrimental effect. For example, crisis conditions may require the delivery of food aid. Poor timing of the delivery, however may adversely affect the prices of local crops, creating disincentives for future production. The goal should be to stabilize food supplies by timing aid with incentives to farmers to avoid destroying the local market for crops.¹³²

Analyzing the outputs focuses on how the project will be used by the population. Will it serve its intended purpose? If not, why? Raphael Carland, a USAID employee working in a PRT related the importance of the little things such as building a wall. "We hated spending extra money on the wall, but to an Afghan, it's like giving them a chair with no legs on it. If you build a building with no wall, to them, it's 'Oh! They'll be able to see my women. They'll be able to see us and what we're doing. They'll see how rich or how poor we are.'"¹³³ For other projects, the operation and maintenance of the project will require consideration, lest it end up broken, vandalized, or occupied by vagrants. Mass public works programs, such as those in Baghdad after the end of major combat operations resulted in clean streets, alleys, buildings, and public spaces, far exceeding what U.S. forces alone could do and drastically reduced where insurgents could place hidden improvised explosive devices.¹³⁴

¹³¹DeFrancisci, 24.

¹³²Keith Crane et al., 41.

¹³³*Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan 2003-2005*, 517.

¹³⁴Martins, 48.

CERP practitioners must understand that while inputs and outputs are important, achieving desired project outcomes determines effectiveness. Intended outcomes drive the selection of projects. Determining the unintended outcomes, however, requires a comprehensive assessment of the stakeholders, physical environment and information environment. This level of analysis is undoubtedly the most difficult. However, successfully identifying unintended outcomes allows the mitigation of negative impacts and planning to take advantage of opportunities. When selecting a project, this analysis might address the following questions: Will this encourage the pursuit of peaceful activities over supporting or condoning violence? Will it engender goodwill toward the government and coalition forces instead of anger and frustration? Will this project reinforce efforts to enhance security, extend governance, and improve economic conditions or damage legitimacy and credibility? The following example better illustrates how unintended outcomes can affect a project's success:

The Task Force, through engagements with locals from the district council down to the local farmer, identified an irrigation project that would enhance agriculture throughout the area of operations. It is a large-scale project that would employ hundreds of unskilled workers and infuse significant amounts of cash into the struggling local economy. It would be completed two months before spring ensuring the next snow thaw would feed water to fields throughout the valley. The desired outcomes in the near-term are infusion of cash into the local economy and increased agricultural production over the long term.

There are several unintended effects of this project. First, the bulk of the labor-intensive construction occurs during the fall harvest. Since the project hired hundreds of workers who would otherwise be available to assist with the harvest, half of the crop will rot on the vine. Next, the contractors hired workers based upon the exclusive recommendations from their tribal elders causing distrust, anger, and dysfunction within the district council. Finally, the demand for raw materials such as cement, bricks, and lumber inflated the price of construction materials to triple the normal level, angering many of the refugees that had returned to rebuild their homes and

businesses in the stability created by the presence of U.S. forces. These negative outcomes were not apparent during project planning.

Analysis of the unintended outcomes might allow the Task Force to make a few adjustments before initiating the project. First, shift the initiation of construction one month later, ensuring unskilled labor fulfill their traditional roles in bringing the harvest to market. Additionally, this one-month shift places the bulk of labor-intensive activities during the poppy harvest, drastically reducing the opium yield. Next, task the district council with developing an employment plan that draws workers equitably from each tribe in the valley. Finally, the delay of a month, while still ensuring project completion before the spring thaw, allows for suppliers to pre-order raw materials minimizing inflation on the local markets.¹³⁵

Final thoughts on INVEST-E

The considerations outlined above are based upon a combination of development “best practice” literature and SSTR experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan captured in interviews, studies, and lessons learned. INVEST-E is intended to serve as a starting point for CERP practitioners when assessing potential projects. The considerations detailed above should be used as a guidebook, rather than a map. In some situations, aspects of the methodology will be in direct contradiction with each other. For instance, CERP practitioners may identify a local need that is not nested within the priorities defined in the host nation development and reconstruction strategy. Or perhaps the local “need” requires contractors and supplies from an adjacent province, violating the “employ local” aspect of the construct. One recurring theme in INVEST-E is developing a sense of ownership or “buy-in” from the local populace. The methodology reveals several ways to develop local “buy-in.” While failing to meet any other aspect of

¹³⁵Hypothetical situation derived from multiple examples by Keith Crane et al., 35, 94, & 105.

INVEST-E in selecting a project may not have an adverse effect on success, failure to develop local ownership will undoubtedly yield failure.

Conclusion

Since the Revolutionary War, the United States has fought in eleven conventional wars. The hundreds of other military operations the United States has undertaken would today be viewed as stability operations.¹³⁶ The Army Operations manual, FM 3-0, outlines five stability tasks: Establish civil security, Establish civil control, Restore essential services, Support governance, and Support economic and infrastructure development.¹³⁷ Of these tasks, only the establishment of civil security is possible without placing money in the hands of operational forces.

This monograph has determined that CERP is a necessary tool for operational forces executing SSTTR. It has also addressed two significant problems, the disconnection between definitions of effective CERP, and the appropriate training to achieve efficacy. The INVEST-E methodology serves as a means to bridge the gap between the popular, operational and tactical, and strategic views of effectiveness and ensures the use of money meets political goal of wisely spending U.S. tax dollars. *Identifying local needs and providing a Timely solution improves the quality of life and meets the basic needs of the population. Employing local labor and local supplies and developing projects that achieve operational and tactical commanders' desired Effects creates relationships that yield actionable intelligence, thereby separating the enemy from the populace. Nesting efforts within national reconstruction and development strategies, Validating legitimate power structures that will form trusted public institutions, and ensuring projects are Sustainable by the people after transition will ensure that strategic objectives are*

¹³⁶Keith Crane et al., 1.

¹³⁷FM 3-0: *Operations*, 3-12.

achieved. This methodology represents a bottom-up approach to compliment the top-down oversight dictated by Congress. Ensuring efficacy begins at project selection by the operational forces that identify and nominate CERP projects.

Beyond serving as a tool to enhance the effectiveness of CERP implementation by operational forces, INVEST-E provides a framework for assessing past and future projects. Efforts to develop metrics to assess CERP's success so often concentrate on the quantitative inputs and outputs. It is difficult to develop metrics that assess intangibles such as local ownership, developing legitimacy, pride, and empowerment. The INVEST-E methodology focuses on developing projects that yield these qualitative outcomes. The model could therefore be used to score project outcomes, providing a quantitative measure of qualitative characteristics. The use of the INVEST-E methodology as an assessment tool would provide validity for the methodology that extends beyond the anecdotes and lessons learned which form the heart of the construct.

The choice of INVEST-E as the acronym to enable the employment of CERP by operational forces is intended to illustrate more than the obvious financial commitment. It implies an investment of time, organizational energy, and effort with a long term outlook on the desired returns. In the near term the investment should provide operational commanders with a methodology to alleviate humanitarian needs, develop local relationships that represent a partnership that marginalizes the threat, and establish foundational infrastructure while ensuring the stewardship of taxpayer dollars. In the long term, our investment yields future commanders who understand how to effectively employ money to create a stable environment conducive to security, governance, and economic prosperity and enduring host-nation partnerships that reap the benefits of the joint venture.

The ability to effectively employ weapon systems requires considerable training to ensure operators are qualified and proficient. This training begins upon entry into the military and

progresses to ensure accurate and efficient employment regardless of the mission and environment. Prior to deployment for overseas contingency operations, commanders verify their unit is qualified on every assigned weapon. However, operational forces are currently “departing the wire” without being qualified on a critical weapon system, the “non-lethal weapon of choice,” money. The military must develop an institutional competency that ensures the effective employment of money as a weapon system. Integrating INVEST-E into the PME and pre-deployment training ensures competent leaders have the tools to concentrate beyond inputs and outputs to achieve effective outcomes. This training will serve as “qualification” on MAAWS.

The implications for the employment of money by operational forces in future contingency operations are apparent. Secretary Gates, in his testimony before Congress, stated: “success in the kinds of conflicts our military finds itself in today—in Iraq, or elsewhere—cannot be achieved by military means alone.”¹³⁸ The requirement to shape the operational environment before hostilities and conduct stability operations concurrently with major combat operations guarantees that CERP or a similar program will be integral to the success of commanders from the strategic to the tactical level.

¹³⁸Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, testimony on the 2008 Defense budget, on 9 May 2007, delivered to the Senate Appropriations Committee, <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1150> (accessed 12 February, 2010).

APPENDIX A Survey Methodology and Results

Commander's Emergency Response Program Survey

Methodology: This voluntary and anonymous survey was administered to two randomly selected populations of fifty eight majors attending the Intermediate Level Education class 10-02 at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The CGSC Quality Assurance Office approved the survey issuing Control Number 10-030a and managed the launch and closeout and published the results. The survey was titled Commander's Emergency Response Program and asked that respondents reflect on CERP projects that you observed while serving overseas in support of OIF/OEF while answering the questions. The questions ranged in variation from agree/disagree, multiple choice, and short answers. Some choices triggered requests to explain the choice.

Purpose: The purpose of this research was to identify whether operational forces are receiving adequate training to ensure the effective use of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Sampling from the ILE class would give access to officers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, some with multiple tours as company and field grade officers serving both as staff officers and in leadership roles.

Results: The survey results were published in two separate documents, one that reflected multiple choice results and the other reflecting written responses. They have been combined in the order questions were presented. Forty eight majors participated in the survey.

1. I received training on CERP prior to deploying overseas.

Yes	19	39.58 %
No	29	60.42 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

2. I received training on CERP upon arrival in theater.

Yes	18	37.50 %
No	30	62.50 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

3. My training prepared me for the accounting procedures for CERP funds usage.

Strongly Agree	3	6.25 %
Agree	14	29.17 %
Neutral	19	39.58 %
Disagree	7	14.58 %
Strongly Disagree	5	10.42 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

4. My training prepared me for CERP project selection.

Agree	12	25.00 %
Neutral	24	50.00 %

Disagree	6	12.50 %
Strongly Disagree	6	12.50 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Disagree or Strongly Disagree] **Question:** Please explain why in a few words.

- n/a is my response
- I have no experience with this program and have received no training
- Did not receive training - poor question. Need N/A
- Never got the training when I depolyed on '03
- did not receive training
- Didn't receive any training

5. My training prepared me for supervision of CERP project execution.

Agree	13	27.08 %
Neutral	21	43.75 %
Disagree	6	12.50 %
Strongly Disagree	8	16.67 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

6. When should CERP training occur?

Basic/Career Course/ILE	10	20.83 %
Pre-Deployment	33	68.75 %
In-theater	2	4.17 %
None required	1	2.08 %
Other	2	4.17 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Other] **Question:** Please explain why in a few words.

- I don't know when it should occur.
- It should occur at all levels and be a comprehensive training plan!

7. In your organization, what duty positions were most often responsible for CERP project selection and management?

- Company XO
- Civil Military Officer
- Commander, XO, RM,
- S4

- The S4 section
- Not observed, but would suggest Commander, Operations, Fires and Effects, Civil Military Affairs, Legal and Resource Manager positions
- XO
- Company Commander's, Platoon Leaders and Fire Support Officers
- S4
- CA/OPS
- ODA Commander
- S4
- G9, G7
- Battalion Commander/Staff
- Do not recall ever happen this responsibility or position within the unit
- S4/G4, XO
- Mostly the CMO cell which fell under Fires and Effects.
- Bde S4 - RM Section
- S8, S4
- xo, cdr, s-4
- BN S4
- Engineers, CA, JAG, BN/BDE S-9
- S-4
- Never involved/dealt with CERP
- I don't know.
- N/A
- Resource management
- CA Officer in consultation with ground force commander
- Staff sections mainly project specific assignments
- C9
- Civil Affairs or Engineer Cell
- N/A
- Not responsible for any CERP projects; only responsible for providing the physical currency to pay them

- Battalion S4 and XO
- Co Cdrs, CA Tm Ldrs, Bn FSO, Bn Cdrs, Bde Eng
- BN XO, BN FSO, BN CA Team Leader, BN CDR
- NA

8. What training would you consider necessary to effectively employ CERP?

- Unknown
- No idea
- Duties and responsibilities of the PPO and PA; Basic contracting principles; How to write a Performance of Work or Scope of Work statement, How to conduct quality assurance
- identify the officers who will run the programs early and train them up on it
- RMs trained on RM roles and responsibilities as well as CERP; Fiscal Law; COR roles and responsibilities; disbursing operations/commercial vendor service ops for CERP;
- Pre-Deployment training
- The current amount of ILE training is great and detailed enough. CERP guidance changes constantly, so training just prior to deployment is the right answer for the specifics!
- Civil Affairs, economic stability, agriculture initiatives...
- Restrictions, Process with emphasis on contracting and a discussion of related funds
- Selection of projects; oversight of projects; nesting of projects with commanders intent; facilitating projects following kinetic targeting
- Resource Management Tactical Training Course (RMTC) Deployment Operations Resource Management Course (DORMC)
- A 40 hr block of instruction
- I don't know.
- Commanders/XO/PLs instructional sessions
- More hands on / how to
- Integration of contracting officers, civil affairs, RM, and JAG could provide thorough program of instruction. Also, must ensure CERP (focusing on the administrative requirements to draw funds, propose projects, and monitor progress) is included in training center rotations.
- not sure
- Have it part of the MRX and provide class on the installation.

- A thorough understanding of what actually constitutes CERP funds, project management training, and some contracting. Each of these aspects is critical to overall project completion.
- Little knowledge through ILE
- The training we received at ILE is in the realm of what we should have received prior to deployment.
- Training received was adequate to employ CERP
- Ethics, legal, financial management and supporting local indigenous populations
- DOs and Don'ts, keeping spending legal. The reason training should be done as a unit, or in theater, is because it is supposed to be the "Commander's" Emergency Response Fund, so understanding how it is incorporated into IO/PSYOP/COIN requires his guidance and oversight.
- Discussion of the CALL Manual and discussion of legal implications for uses of CERP funds as well as other "colors" of money and resources
- Increase the frequency of this training.
- Explanation of what can and cannot be used for. Legal restrictions and request and accounting procedures.
- Finance and Contracting.
- administrative process for paperwork
- CERP overview for commanders and staff. Individual training for designated officer

9. Within my organization Platoon Leaders identified CERP projects.

Yes	28	58.33 %
No	20	41.67 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

10. Within my organization Company/Battery Commanders identified CERP projects.

Yes	36	75.00 %
No	12	25.00 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

11. Within my organization Battalion/Squadron Commander/Staff identified CERP projects.

Yes	38	79.17 %
No	10	20.83 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

12. A discussion with local leaders identified necessary projects

Strongly Agree	8	16.67 %
Agree	15	31.25 %
Neutral	20	41.67 %
Disagree	1	2.08 %

Strongly Disagree	4	8.33 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Strongly Agree or Agree] **Question:** Interaction with which type of leaders proved most necessary to successful project selection?

(Not Answered)	25	52.08 %
Local mullah	3	6.25 %
Local elected leader	4	8.33 %
Tribal leader	10	20.83 %
District official	3	6.25 %
Other	3	6.25 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

13. The project supported the reconstruction and development strategy developed by the host nation and coalition forces.

(Not Answered)	1	2.08 %
Strongly Agree	4	8.33 %
Agree	20	41.67 %
Neutral	20	41.67 %
Disagree	1	2.08 %
Strongly Disagree	2	4.17 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Disagree or Strongly Disagree] **Question:** In a few words explain why.

- Needed better coordination
- I am a Resource Manager. I funded approved projects. I did not propose projects.
- Didn't do CERP projects in my AO

14. Strict utilization of a central government or CJTF project list determined project selection.

(Not Answered)	1	2.08 %
Strongly Agree	1	2.08 %
Agree	10	20.83 %
Neutral	27	56.25 %
Disagree	5	10.42 %
Strongly Disagree	4	8.33 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Strongly Agree or Agree] **Question:** In a few words explain why?

- It was the Ground Commander/AO owner's call for CERP
- We used the DAC leaders input, but also included Sunni input which was largely disregarded within the government.
- To ensure all AOR are meeting the strategic objective
- Subordinate units weren't always nested with higher project lists

- Needed better coordination to nest projects
- All competing projects were weighed, prioritized or merged

15. Successful projects maximized the use of goods and services (labor, raw materials).

(Not Answered)	1	2.08 %
Strongly Agree	3	6.25 %
Agree	17	35.42 %
Neutral	23	47.92 %
Disagree	1	2.08 %
Strongly Disagree	3	6.25 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Strongly Agree or Agree] **Question: Which of the following best describes why the use of local labor and materials was positively linked to project success? (Select all that apply)**

(Not Answered)	28	28.57 %
Employed military-aged males	13	13.27 %
Use of local materials created a sense of ownership	10	10.20 %
Use of local labor created a sense of ownership	13	13.27 %
Use of local labor prevented attacks on the project by anti-government forces	8	8.16 %
Use of local materials prevented attacks on the project by anti-government forces	6	6.12 %
Income generated by local merchants supporting the project improved local economic conditions	9	9.18 %
Income generated by local workers supporting the project improved local economic conditions	10	10.20 %
Other	1	1.02 %
Total Responses	98	100.00%

16. Upon completion, the project was able to be maintained indefinitely by the local government and/or populace.

(Not Answered)	1	2.08 %
Agree	12	25.00 %
Neutral	24	50.00 %
Disagree	8	16.67 %
Strongly Disagree	3	6.25 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Disagree or Strongly Disagree] **Question:** In a few words explain why.

- During 2007 in Iraq, the local government rarely saw allocation of funds to support continued support of CERP funded projects.
- They do not have the technical expertise to conduct maintenance
- Too many units did CERP projects that were not wanted/needed by locals so they were not maintained
- Lack of coordination with local national forces; no infrastructure to support the

project (why build a school if the government can't pay for the teachers)

- CERP projects were essentially "fire and forget" since it was not programmed with a sustainment mechanism
- I did not have the ability to view or comment on projects.
- More funding required for maintenance.
- they did not have the education or funding to support the projects
- Didn't do CERP projects in my AO

17. Quick initiation and completion of a project was not always the best measure of project success.

(Not Answered)	1	2.08 %
Strongly Agree	1	2.08 %
Agree	18	37.50 %
Neutral	25	52.08 %
Strongly Disagree	3	6.25 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Disagree or Strongly Disagree] **Question:** In a few words explain why?

- competing costs
- Quick sometimes equals poor quality
- To maximize local impact and tie to performance measures, sometimes a delay was necessary or desired
- Poor quality
- How many soccer fields does a community need...did not always get to the heart of the problem or the intent of CERP
- It could not be comprehensive if rushed
- Regardless of how quickly it was completed, if the project was not deemed necessary and was not sustainable by the local officials, it would not succeed.
- sometimes it takes a long time for approval and contractors are unreliable

18. How well did CERP projects within your AO support the legitimacy of the local government?

(Not Answered)	6	12.50 %
Very supportive	4	8.33 %
Supportive	33	68.75 %
Not supportive	3	6.25 %
Counter-productive to legitimacy	2	4.17 %
Total Responses	48	100.00%

[If Not Supportive or Counter-productive] **Question:** In a few words explain why?

- Didn't do CERP project sin my AOR
- Lack of coordination
- Does not apply to my deployment
- Time frame was too short

19. In your experience, successful projects were ones that were initiated and completed in the following timeframe.

(Not Answered)	5	10.42 %
3 months or less	13	27.08 %
Greater than 3 to 6 months	11	22.92 %
Greater than 6 to 9 months	6	12.50 %
Greater than 9 to 12 months	1	2.08 %
Greater than 12 months	1	2.08 %
Other	11	22.92 %

Total Responses 48 100.00%

[If Other] **Question:** In a few words explain why?

- Projects not selected on an integrated basis for long term impact.
- Does not apply to my deployment
- No experience managing CERP
- Duration is a poor MOE. The most successful projects were ones completed close to budget and accepted by the local officials.
- Didn't do CERP project sin my AOR

20. Please choose the 2 selection criteria that in your experience most contributed to project success

(Not Answered)	8	16.67 %
Provides for local needs	9	18.75 %
Supports U.S. Government and Higher Headquarters goals	3	6.25 %
Supports Host Nation development Strategy	4	8.33 %
Reinforces legitimate power structures	3	6.25 %
Makes use of local labor and materials	6	12.50 %
Is maintainable by local populace after handover	8	16.67 %
Addresses needs in a timely fashion	7	14.58 %

Total Responses 48 100.00%

21. What additional criteria should be used to select CERP projects?

- Reinforces legitimate power structures
- Reinforces legitimate power structures--Legitimizes Government

- In Iraq, CEPR was further designated as ICERP. No ICERP projects were initiated unless the local officials agreed that they would maintain the project after completion. Too many projects were completed but never utilized because there was no local buy-in, so it became a requirement before projects were moved past the concept stage.
- Provides for local needs
- none
- Supports Host Nation development Strategy
- Will not negatively impact other related systems within the municipality

22. Illustrate an example of a successful CERP project and explain why it was successful?

- I am not very familiar with the CERP program.
- n/a
- Litter and debris pickup in Mosul. Employed many locals and not resource intensive.
- project that had good COR involvement where the project could be completed
- Governance communications initiatives because it supported span of governance
- Built a road and town became more government friendly.
- I have not used CERP
- I don't know.
- Fix local water plant
- I was not part of any CERP project, I was only aware of them based on the meetings I attended with the Division staff.
- A CERP project was executed to repair the sewage system in SW Baghdad to assist in dealing with the backlog of sewage which was bubbling up in the Muhallas(SP?). The project was identified by the landowning company as well as the DAC. Working with the DAC the project was put into place with planned visits by the DAC leaders ICW Host Nation security forces. The project resulted in immediate fix with no visible plan for maintenance of the system beyond the pumping stations
- REPLACING WINDOWS IN A SCHOOL
- Trash Removal and Collection, employed Local Nationals, benefited locals with sanitation and coalition for safety from IED threat in trash
- payment for destroyed property

23. Illustrate an unsuccessful CERP project and explain what prevented its effectiveness?

- have no knowledge

- playground/parks with toys for kids to play on--without security the kids would not play on the stuff anyway
- DRILLING A WATER WELL
- *ANTI-COALITION FORCES ATTACKED IT TO PREVENT LOCAL POPULACE FROM GETTING CLEAN WATER
- Concrete around Saydia, Baghdad. The project was designed to create a secure environment, but the Son's of Iraq did much more to address the problems within the OE. Although the project was inline with the desires of the Host Nation Security forces, I believe it may not have been the best use of the money or manpower required to complete the project.
- I was not part of any CERP project, I was only aware of them based on the meetings I attended with the Division staff.
- we did not do it...but PRT did...built a hospital....they did not have the technical experitise to operate it or to conduct routine mainteance on the event.
- I don't know.
- I have not used CERP
- As noted, built a school but there were no teachers.
- Communal initiatives not synchronized with national/international efforts
- coordinating a project with th contract/contractor that disappeared.
- School renovation. Most of the plumbing and electrical was quickly looting upon completion.
- n/a

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